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INTRODUCTION

In its September 1993 report on "reinventing government," the
Clinton administration observed that federal government programs
today have a dismal reputation among the nation's citizens:
It is almost as if federal programs were designed not to
work. In truth, few are "designed" at all; the legislative process simply churns them out, one after another, year after
year. It's little wonder that when asked if "government always manages to mess things up," two-thirds of Americans
say "yes."1
The United States' existing system for controlling pollution is no exception. It is currently under attack from many quarters. 2 For example, even environmental leaders such as former EPA
Administrator William Reilly, while giving credit to our environmental laws for the improvements they have produced, question the basic structure of the existing regime for its failure to view problems
TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A
(1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL
Jonathan Rauch contrasts the
current level of confidence in government with the level of confidence that existed in the late
1950s. The contrast is not encouraging.
In 1958, 75 percent of the public said it trusted the government in Washington to "do
what's right" always or most of the time ....
[Iln February 1993 it [the trust level]
reached a new low, with only one in five Americans expressing trust in government to do
the right thing.
JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMOSCLEROSIS: THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 9 (1994).
Mr. Rauch cites other evidence for the decline of confidence in government: "Other data tell the
same story of disillusionment. Seven in ten Americans say that the government creates more
problems than it solves, rather than vice versa." Id. at 9-10; see also Paul A. Gigot, 103rd
Congress: Pass the Balloons and Party Hats, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1994, at A10 (citing "Beltway
weathervane" Bill Schneider of CNN for the propositions that "[vioters ... profoundly doubt
government can do anything well" and "[tihe biggest change in public opinion in the last 30
years is the collapse of confidence in government").
2 See Daniel P. Selmi, Experimentationand the New'Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 1061, 1061 (1994) (noting that "[a]fter almost a quarter century of federally centered
environmental regulation, the existing regulatory system satisfies almost no one. Indeed, if
the goals at stake were not so important, the criticism directed at federal environmental law
has become so regular that it seems almost wearisome."); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of
Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1991, at 311, 314 (suggesting a "pathological cycle" of public and institutional distrust
of the EPA); Keith Schneider, New View Calls Environmental Policy Misguided, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1993, at Al (noting that "[a] generation after the United States responded to poisoned
streams and filthy air with the world's first comprehensive strategy to protect the
environment, many scientists, economists and Government officials have reached the
dismaying conclusion that much of America's environmental program has gone seriously
awry").
1 AL GORE, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED

GOVERNMENT THAT WoRKS BETTER & COSTS LESS 1
PERFORMANCE REVIEW]. In .his recent book Demosclerosis,
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comprehensively or to prioritize among them.3 Local governments
have also launched a broad scale assault on our environmental laws,
with a particular focus on the issue of unfunded environmental mandates. 4 And, as a third example, other observers of the environmen3 See, .e.g., William K. Reilly, The Future of Environmental Law, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 351
(1989); Schneider, 8upra note 2, at A30 (quoting an interview with former EPA administrator
William K. Reilly: "We need to develop a new system for taking action on the environment that
isn't based on responding to the nightly news.... What we have had in the United States is
environmental agenda-setting by episodic panic."). Former Administrator Reilly's criticism is
widely shared. Former EPA General Counsel Donald Elliott noted that:
This country is long overdue for a national debate on our policies toward environmental
risk.... We cannot maintain forever the fiction that we are rich enough (or foolish
enough) to spend whatever it takes to eliminate all risks, even trivial ones, instantly from
our environment. We must set rational priorities based on the best science available and
devote our limited resources first to the areas where the opportunities for risk reduction
are greatest.
E. Donald Elliott, Superfind: EPA Success, National Debacle?, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Winter 1992, at 11, 48; see also AL GORE, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
PERFORMANCE REVIEW, CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS:
IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS 3, 55 (1993) (hereinafter IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS]

(suggesting that "agencies concentrate their regulatory resources on the most serious
environmental, health, and safety risks and engage in long-term regulatory planning," and
recommending that "[h]eads of regulatory agencies involved in the regulation of
environmental, health, or safety risks should direct their agencies to rank the seriousness of
those risks to permit better prioritization of their regulatory agendas"); U.S. GAO, GAO/OCG94-1, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, MANAGEMENT REFORM: GAO's COMMENTS ON
THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEw'S RECOMMENDATIONS 55 (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter GAO
COMMENTS) (also finding a place on the bandwagon favoring prioritization, noting: "We concur
with the need for measurable environmental goals .... These goals ...

are critical for [the]

EPA to ensure that (1) the most pressing environmental needs are addressed in an era of
limited resources and (2) progress in these efforts can be tracked and assessed."); U.S. EPA,
SAB-EC-90-021, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES, FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 6 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter REDUCING RISK]; cf AMOCO CORP. & U.S. EPA,
AMoco-U.S. EPA POLLUTION PREVENTION PROJECT: YORKrOWN, VIRGINIA at v (May 1992)
[hereinafter AMoco STUDY] (noting that "[clurrent [EPA] administrative procedures
discourage . . .the analysis of tradeoffs in risks, benefits, and costs of managing residual
pollutants in different media").
4 See generally ENVIRONMENTAL LAw REVIEW COMM., ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION: THE
INCREASING COSTS OF REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TO THE CITY OF COLUMBUS 12 (May 13, 1991)
[hereinafter COLUMBUS STUDY]; U.S. EPA, EPA 230-R-93-007, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATES: FIVE CASE STUDIES 15 (Aug. 1993)
[hereinafter EPA FIVE CASE STUDIES]; David L. Markell, The Role of Local Governments in
Environmental Regulation:Shoring Up Our Federal System, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 885 (1994).
A 1990 General Accounting Office report notes that state and local officials cite the
expansion of federal regulation of states and localities as "the most negative trend of the past
decade" and that "tensions between the federal and state and local governments are
mounting." U.S. GAO, GAO/HRD-90-34, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITrEES, FEDERALSTATE-LocAL RELATIONS: TRENDS OF THE PAST DECADE AND EMERGING ISSUES 2-3 (Mar. 1990)
[hereinafter FEDERAL-STATE-LocAL RELATIONS].
A-recent New York Times article suggests that this issue, among others, is likely to be raised
"whenever Congress debates an environmental bill." John H. Cushman, Jr., E.P.A Critics Get
Boost in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994, at Al, A15. This article also notes that another
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tal regulatory scheme, including the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO), have criticized efforts to secure compliance with the environmental laws.'
proposal is to "force the environmental agency [EPA] to demonstrate that every new
regulation [is] worth its cost." Id. at Al.
State and local government officials have not limited their criticisms of the existing
environmental regulatory scheme to the'issue of unfunded mandates. These officials seem to
share the concern voiced by former Administrator Reilly and others that a need exists to
prioritize environmental issues. The National Governors' Association urged that "[flederal
environmental laws and regulations must recognize the need to set priorities and focus on the
most important environmental objectives at the national, state, and local levels." Governors'
Association Approves Policy Callingfor Federal Funding of Mandates, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1726, 1726 (Feb. 4, 1994) (quoting National Governors' Association policy). Nevada Governor
Bob Miller, commenting on 'the policy, stated that instead of using environmental mandates in
which everything is of equal importance, "[tihe time has come to set realistic priorities among
environmental programs so that we can focus on the most important environmental objectives
at the national, state, and local level. Id. (quoting Governor Miller). Taking the opposite
position are people such as Ralph Nader and Linda Greer, a senior scientist with the Natural
Resources Defense Council. Both have challenged the "morality" of prioritizing among risks
because "choosing which risk to pursue as a policy decision [is] immoral in a society as affluent
as ours." Risk Hits Primetimel COMP. RISK BULL. (Northeast Ctr. for Comparative Risk, Vt.
Law Sch.), May-June 1994, at 1.
5 See, e.g. U.S. GAO, GAO/IMTEC-92-58BR, BRIEFING REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, COMMIrEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC
WORKS, U.S. SENATE, WATER POLLUTION MONITORING: EPA's PERMIT COMPLIANCE SYSTEM
COULD BE USED MORE EFFECTELY 25 (June 1992) [hereinafter WATER POLLUTION
MONITORING]; U.S. GAO, GAO/RCED-90-101, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING
MINORITY MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC

WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WATER POLLUTION: IMPROVED
MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT NEEDED FOR TOXIC POLLUTANTS ENTERING SEWERS 36-38, 4445, 48 (Apr. 1989); U.S. GAO, GAO/RCED-92-107, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: ALTERNATIVE ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS FOR EPA*30 (Apr.
1992) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE ENFORCEMENT]; U.S. GAO, GAO/RCED-91-166, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: PENALTIES MAY NoT RECOVER

ECONOMIC BENEFITS GAINED BY VIOLATORS 14-16 (June 1991); U.S. GAO, GAO/RCED-90-155,
REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM.

ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON

ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AIR POLLUTION: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED
IN DETECTING AND PREVENTING VIOLATIONS 30, 41 (Sept. 1990); U.S. GAO, GAO/RCED-89-65,
REPORT TO THE HONORABLE ARLEN SPECTER, U.S. SENATE, INLAND

OIL SPILLS:' STRONGER

2-3 (Feb. 1989); Charles
L. Grizzle, EPA-An Agency in Need of Strategic Realignment, 2 CORP. ENVTL. STRATEGY 49,
51 (1994) ("[The] EPA must make a fundamental shift from quantitative enforcement to
qualitative enforcement.... Regulatory enforcement is often a numbers game and we have
now unleashed a bean-counting frenzy. The results are inspections yielding picayune
violations, the correction of which often lead to little environmental gain."); cf. Peter J.
Fontaine, EPA's Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The Struggle To Close the Environmental
Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 34-35, 38 (1993) (noting that while the EPA's
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT NEEDED To AVOID FUTURE INCIDENTS

enforcement program has -been producing record numbers of enforcement actions and
penalties, enforcement has "largely been an uncoordinated, piecemeal effort," and discussing
the "inefficiencies of the EPA's fragmented enforcement system").
Other critics of the existing regulatory scheme include the following: (1) "[E]nvironmental
justice" advocates, who challenge the fairness of the existing regulatory scheme. See Richard

J. Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice'. The DistributionalEffects of Environmental
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The jury is still out concerning how successfully the federal government will respond to these challenges. At this juncture, Congress
and the Clinton administration have acknowledged that concerns
exist with respect to our environmental laws and practices.' In fact,
Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993) (discussing the thesis that minority groups, among
others, bear a disproportionate amount of environmental burdens); Rachel D. Godsil, Note,
Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 397-400 (1991) (noting that
minority communities are exposed to higher levels of pollutants than whites). But see Mary
Bryant, UnequalJustice?Lies, Damn Lies, and StatisticsRevisited, SONREEL NEws, Sept.-Oct.
1993, at 3 (suggesting that the data does not support the "environmental justice" movement);
Larry E. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
SELECTED READINGS 20, 29 (Robert Dorfman & Nancy S. Dorfman eds., 3d ed. 1993) (indicating
his view that environmental regulatory agencies should not have the responsibility "to change
the distribution of welfare in society; this is the responsibility of higher authorities"). (2) Some
economists, among others, who dispute the efficiency of our approach to environmental
regulation. See, e.g., PUBLIc POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Paul R. Portney ed.,
1st ed. 3rd prtg. 1992); Ruff, supra, at 22. (3) Various representatives of regulated industry,
who long have complained about the high cost of environmental regulation. See, e.g.,
IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 7 ("Everyone running a business has his or
her own illustration of unnecessary regulation."); Vernon R. Rice, Regulating Reasonably,
ENVTL. F., May/June 1994, at 16, 21 ("Industry has been saying this [that "the costs of some
environmental programs exceed their benefits"] for years."). A 1993 U.S. Bureau of the Census
study finding that "productivity was reduced by the equivalent of 3 to 4 dollars per dollar of
pollution abatement costs," rather than the dollar per dollar reduction that traditionally had
been assumed, undoubtedly will add fuel to these criticisms. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

SB/93-13,

STATISTICAL BRIEF: MEASURING THE PRODUCTIVITY IMPACT OF

POLLUTION ABATEMENT 1, 2 (Nov., 1993).
6 Current EPA Administrator Carol M.

Browner offered the following testimony before
Congress concerning the issue of mandates, among other things, on March 31, 1993:
State, tribal and local governments feel overwhelmed by the breadth, complexity and cost
of existing environmental needs, mandates and expectations, and must get some relief. If
States, tribes, and local governments fail in their environmental management efforts, and
they are in danger of failing, then EPA fails .... Responsible stewardship of the nation's
environmental agenda requires exercising the utmost leadership in bring (sic] together
the best of Federal efforts and State, tribal, and local efforts.
Taking Stock of Environmental Problems:Hearingsbefore the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 169 (1993) (statement of Carol M. Browner,
Administrator, U.S. EPA).
U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan recently noted the increasing tendency of local
governments to question the legitimacy of regulatory objectives:
Obviously, we are seeing a new trend. Federal environmental laws are being questioned
by state and local governments, which say they can't afford to comply with all
environmental laws.... An editorial in the January 8, 1993, issue of Science magazine
alerts us to the "growing questioning of the factual basis for federal command-and-control
actions," all because of concerns over regulatory costs. The message is clear. State and
local governments will hold Congress and the EPA more accountable in the future about
obligating them to spend their resources on federal requirements. They will want "proof"
that there is a problem and confidence that the legislated solution will solve it.
California's threat to return enforcement of its drinking water program to the EPA last
spring speaks volumes. The most environmentally advanced state in the Union close to
rebellion-a sobering prospect. The Science editorial suggests we are seeing the
"beginning of a revolt."
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some members of Congress have concluded that flaws exist in the
current environmental regulatory scheme and that they personally
(or at least institutionally) deserve some of the blame.7 Such candor
is useful. As William F. Pedersen aptly put it:
The complexity of environmental issues and the short attention span of the media allow fake claims of victory and disaster to be taken-all too often-at face value. Here, as in other
walks of life, candor about our failings . . . will be the indispensable prelude to progress in the future.8
It would be nice if the question of what strategies we should adopt
at the federal level to improve our environmental regulatory structure and the administration of our environmental laws were only a
"$64,000 question," 9 but it has far greater financial implications
than that. 10 The importance of trying to find answers to this quesDaniel P. Moynihan, A Legislative Proposal: Why Not Enact a Law That Would Help Us Set
Sensible Priorities?,EPA J., Jan.-Mar. 1993, at 46-47.
7 See, e.g., EnvironmentalMandates, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1727 (Feb. 4, 1994) (summarizing
Senator Baucus's "pledge" to reform "excessive mandates" and his statement that "Congress
needs to find the balance 'between environmental protection, and reasonableness, and
common sense,'" which impliedly acknowledges that Congress's legislative efforts in the
1980's paid little attention to the latter two factors); Keith Schneider, Second Chance on
Environment: Opportunity To Redefine Core of American Policy on Pollution,N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 1993, at A17 (reporting:
Several members of Congress said that one lesson of environmental policy-making in the
1980's was that acting on the basis of being safe rather than sorry had unintended
consequences. Not the least of them has been many costly rules that are not producing
measurable improvements in public health or the environment.).
Mr. Schneider further stated that "[sleveral leading members [of Congress] said that too often
Congress has moved from panic to panic and not developed, a uniform approach to consider
risks." Id. Finally, the author summarized the views of Representative Mike Synar, the Chair
of the House Subcommittee on the Environment: "'Costs are out of sight,' and the benefits
from many recent environmental programs are not apparent." Id.
Several commentators have similarly argued that Congress bears a considerable portion of
the blame for problems in the current scheme. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected
Question of CongressionalOversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Costodes (Who Shall Watch
the Watchers Themselves)?, LAw & CONrEMP. PRos., Autumn 1991, at 205, 210-18.
8 William F. Pedersen, 'Protectingthe Environment". What Does That Mean?, 27 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 969, 978 (1994).
9 "The $64,000 Question," a game show created by Merton Y. Koplin in 1955, featuring
figures such as Dr. Joyce Brothers, was the most popular show of its time and the origin of the
now-common phrase "the $64,000 question." MY. Koplin Had Role in Quiz Scandal, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 18, 1992, at B5.
10 See, e.g., David L. Markell, Internalizing the Costs Of Pollution: Trends in US
EnvironmentalPolicy, 1 CORP. ENVrL. STRATEGY 43 (1993)'[hereinafter Markell, Internalizing
the Costs of Pollution] (noting that "the U.S. economy spends more than $170 billion per year
on environmental protection"); Rice, supra note 5, at' 16 (indicating that "[clurrent estimates
put environmental spending at about $150 billion per year in the United States").
One aspect of this issue that this Article does not address in detail concerns the respective
roles that federal, state, and local governments should play. For a general discussion of this
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tion is highlighted by the remarkable conclusion in a recent U.S.
EPA/Amoco Corporation case study concerning environmental regulation of Amoco's Yorktown, Virginia oil refinery. The study concluded that "about 97, percent of the release reductions that
[environmental] regulatory and statutory programs require can be
achieved for about 25 percent of today's cost for these programs."11
This finding signals that the potential exists to produce enormous
improvements in our current system of regulating pollution.
What strategies should we adopt at the federal level to address
concerns about (1) the piecemeal nature of our existing regulatory
regime and our resulting failure to prioritize in a rational way, (2)
unfunded mandates, and (3) the efficacy of current strategies to promote compliance with the environmental laws? The short answer is
that a threshold strategy should be initiated to invest resources in
learning from and encouraging innovative state efforts that address
these problem areas. Today, state governments, Justice Brandeis's
"laboratories of democracy, " 12 are "making a reality of this textbook
description." 13 AS Professor Evan Ringquist observes in his recent
book, while:
the EPA was created and .. [the Clean Air Act, the Clean
Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and
other flagship] pieces of federal [environmental] legislation
passed largely because states had failed to protect environmental quality on their own prior to 1970[,]... many states
issue, see ALICE M. RvwN, REvIvnG THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE EcONOMY, THE STATES & THE
FEDERAL GovERNMENr 8 (1992) (noting that "[t]he argument about which functions should be
exercised by the federal government and which by the states has been going on for more than
two hundred years"). For a discussion of this issue in the context of the cleanup of toxic waste
sites, see David L. Markell, The Federal Superfund Program:Proposalsfor Strengtheningthe
Federal/StateRelationship, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENvTL. L. 1, 3-4 (1993) [hereinafter Markell,
The Federal Superfund Program] ("Controversy concerning the appropriate division of
responsibility and power between the federal government and the states has a long history in
the United States, extending back at least to the eighteenth century .... This historical
dispute encompasses the debate over the appropriate locus of authority for environmental
regulation.").
11 AMoco STuDY, supra note 3, at v. The study found that "Ithe cost-effectiveness of the
flexible option [i.e., a more flexible, results-oriented approach to environmental regulation] is
about $600/ton compared with the cost-effectiveness of $2,400/ton for [current] regulatory
requirements." Id. at 16.
Recently, DuPont's Vernon Rice stated that "regulatory-driven initiatives cost three times
more for the same environmental benefit." Rice, supra note 5, at 21.
12 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13 U.S. ADVIsoRY COMm'N ON INTERGOVERNM ENTAL RELATIONS, PuB. No. A-98, THE
QUESTION OF STATE GovERNmENT CAPABLrrY 23 (1985) [hereinafter ACIR REPORT] ("Long
called the 'laboratories of democracy,' states today are making a reality of this text-book
description . . ").
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have tossed away their recalcitrant stance toward strong environmental programs, and in many instances state governments, not "the feds," are at the forefront in efforts to protect
the environment.

14

Other commentators have similarly noted that states occupy an increasingly prominent role in environmental regulation and that considerable innovation has occurred at the state and local levels,
making these governmental efforts especially rich mines to explore. 15 In his book Public Policies for Environmental Protection,
Paul Portney of Resources for the Future notes that "[o]ver the past
decade or so some of the most interesting environmental initiatives
have arisen at the state level."16 J. William Futrell, President of the
Environmental Law Institute, makes the same point in a recent article, stating that "[t]he prospects for early innovation and experimentation on the state level are better than in Washington."' 7
14 EVAN

J.

RINGQUIST, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT THE STATE LEVEL: POLITICS AND

PRolRESS IN CONTROLLING POLLUTrrION at xiii (1993) (suggesting that states are becoming

increasingly valuable as "laboratories" because they have become increasingly sophisticated);
see ACIR REPORT, supra note 13, at 386; FEDERAL-STATE-LoCAL RELATIONS, supra note 4, at 3
("States have increased their prominence... and now stand at the threshold of the 1990s as
highly visible leaders in a broad range of domestic policies. In part, this is due to the increased
institutional and administrative capacity of states."); Id. at 32 ("[Sltates have progressed... to
a period in which they are touted as key innovators.").
15 Management Deficiencies in Environmental Enforcement: "Forceless Enforcement":
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 102nd Cong.,' 1st. Sess. 93-94
(1991) (testimony of James M. Strock, Secretary, Office of Environmental Protection,
California); Environmental Issues and Avtex Fibers, Inc.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Toxic Substances, Environmental Oversight, Research and Development of the Senate Comm.
on Environment and Public Works, 101st Cong., 2nd. Sess. 29 (1990) [hereinafter Avtex Fibers
Hearing] (statement of David Bailey, Director of Environmental Defense Fund, Virginia);
JAMES M. McEI1sH, JR. & JOHN PENDERORASS, ENVTL. LAw INST., RESEARCH BRIEF No. 2,
REAUTHORIZING SUPERFUND: LESSONS FROM THE STATES 4 (Dec. 1993). In a recent column,

commentator George Will noted that there is a "national tendency [that] almost anything done
by government at the local level is apt to be more interesting than almost everything done by
government at the national level." George Will, A Johnson Who's No LBJ, TIMES UNION
(Albany), Mar. 24, 1994, at A10.
16 Paul R. Portney, Overall Assessment and Future Directions, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 275, 283.
Recommendation number two in Vice President Gore's Improving Regulatory Systems is
entitled Encourage More Innovative Approaches to Regulation. IMPROVING REGULATORY
SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 23. It recommends creation of a "Deskbook" to "improve
understanding of the full range of alternative approaches by providing both policymakers and
staff with ready information about the range of regulatory approaches.... The Deskbook
should also provide an in-depth survey of how innovative approaches have been used in both
federal and state governments." Id. at 26.
17 J. William Futrell, Law of SustainableDevelopment, ENvrL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 16, 20.
Congress contemplated that states would administer many of the federal environmental
laws. See generally Clean Water Act, 33 U.S:C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. 1993);
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A recently reported anecdote makes the point well: In June 1993in a much touted initiative-President Clinton signed Executive Order No. 12,852, creating a Council on Sustainable Development to
develop policy recommendations for sustainable development.'" According to a report in a recent environmental newsletter, a group of
community leaders told. members of this Council that "the best way
to achieve goals was to make sure that the federal government does
not 'get in the way' of their sustainable development projects."1 9 A
co-chair of the Council said that" '[the message we kept getting was
that there was an enormous amount of activity at the community
level ....

[Wlhat the council is trying to do at the federal level is

already being done at the community level.' "20
In sum, innovations at the state level are likely to hold a great
deal of promise as potential strategies for addressing
concerns about
21
federal approaches to environmental regulation.
The emergence of state governments as central actors in the environmental arena should not be unexpected. It also should not be
unwelcome. Concerning the former, the existence of fifty state governments, as well as many more local governments, within our fed22
eral system inherently creates both numerous "innovation centers"
and the opportunity to try a wide variety of approaches simultaneously or within short periods of time.23
Clean Air Act, Id. §§ 7401-7671q; Portney, supra note 16, at 282-83. States also act
independently to protect their citizens from environmental threats. See, e.g., New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). This is true both in terms of states' actions
in implementing these federal environmental laws and in states' actions independent of these
federal laws to protect the health of their citizens and the quality of their. environment. More
than one commentator has suggested that the current federal system discourages state
innovations and that the system needs to give states greater flexibility to structure their
programs so as to maximize environmental results. See, e.g., McELFISH & PENDERGRASS,
supra note 15, at 4.
18 Exec. Order No. 12,852, 58 Fed. Reg. 35,841 (1993).
19 SustainableDevelopment LeadersAsk for Independence, FederalFlexibility,ENVTL. POL'Y
ALERT, Feb. 2, 1994, at 42.
20 Id. at 43. This member of the Council also stated that local sustainable development
leaders "asked that the federal government not be prescriptive and allow local communities
the flexibility to develop programs." Id.
21 See ENVIRONmENTAL LAW INST., REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
NEW STATE AND LOCAL APPROACHES To ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION at iv (Aug. 1993)

[hereinafter ELIVOTA REPORT] ("Many environmental laws and programs originate with state
and local governments. These include innovative approaches to environmental regulation as
well as other approaches used in lieu of, or as supplements to, regulatory mechanisms.");
MCELFISH & PENDERGRASS, supra note 15, at 4 (discussing state innovations in the Superfund
arena).

22 See Markell, The Federal Superfund Program, supra note 10, at 73.
23 Commentators have noted that "[u]nsuccessful state programs are nearly as important"
as successful ones for the lessons they teach. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a
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In addition, there also appears to be some merit to the view that
state and local governments tend to be more nimble and receptive to
change than the federal government. As Professor Stenzel notes in a
recent article in discussing "right to act"24 laws:
The process of starting on the state or local level seems to
work well politically, because the public seems more willing to
accept new approaches on a local or state level rather than at
the national level. Individual states can choose varying mechanisms as the tools for achieving their goals. Then, those laws
can be examined to see which options have proven to be the
most effective. 25
Third, looking to state and local governments is likely to pay dividends because ideas developed there will have been "realitytested."26 Despite the fact that the bulk of scholarly attention and
environmental courses in the nation's law schools have traditionally
Learning Experience, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 791, 801 (1994); see McELFISH & PENDERGRASS,
supra note 15, at 4. For a discussion of this issue in the context of Congress's efforts to
reauthorize Superfund, see David L. Markell, "Reinventing Government": A Conceptual
Framework for Evaluating the Proposed Superfund Reform Act of 1994's Approach To
Intergovernmental Relations, 24 LEwis & CLARK ENvL. L.J. 1055, 1090-94 (1994).
Several commentators have noted that the federal government sometimes unnecessarily
impedes such creativity. See, e.g., McELFISH & PENDERGRASS, supra note 15, at 4; Fontaine,
supra note 5, at 94-95; Markell, supra note 23, at 1093.
Rigidity in the system is particularly unfortunate and counterproductive, both as a
theoretical matter because of the inconsistency of such an approach with the reinventing
government principles, and because, as Professor Ringquist noted, state governments are
"closer to many environmental problems; and after twenty years of federal policy leadership
we have learned that flexibility in response to local conditions is a necessary (though not
sufficient) feature of successful environmental programs." RINGQuIST, supra note 14, at xiii.
24 Professor Stenzel describes right to act (RTA) laws as "legislation... designed to give
workers and community residents the power to prevent, or at least avoid exposure to,
workplace hazards.... RTA legislation empowers workers and community residents to take
preventative measures against workplace hazards or, at least, to avoid exposure to present
hazards." Paulette L. Stenzel, Right To Act: Advancing the Common Interests of Labor and
Environmentalists, 57 ALB. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1993).
25 Id. at 37; cf. Richard A. Merrill, Congress as Scientists, ENVrL. F., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 21
(noting that "[Because of scientific developments, the Delaney clause created a rule that] was
quickly outdated and increasingly dysfunctional. Yet, only now, 35 years later, does it appear
likely that Congress will revisit its earlier decision."). Speaking more generally, but reaching
the same conclusion that the federal government is reluctant to revisit earlier approaches,
Vice President Gore's report notes: "Despite more than a decade of high-level support,
innovative approaches are not widely used by agencies.... It is always easier to model a new
program after an old one." IMPRoviO REGULATORY SYSTEMs, supra note 3, at 26.
Legitimate questions have been raised concerning state and local government competence to
address certain issues. See, e.g., RiNGQUIsT, supra note 14, at 43; Mary C. Wood, State Over
Its Head As Spill Decision-Maker,THE OEGoNLAN (Portland, Or.), Aug. 4, 1994, at B9; cf.
supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that states are very able to address certain
issues).
26 See ACIR REPORT, supra note 13, at 400-01.
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focused on federal environmental regulation, 27 many commentators
have begun to recognize that the majority of the real work in implementing and administering the environmental laws actually occurs
in state and local governments. One commentator notes:
Most environmental law in the United States is state
law.... These laws affect more people, more decisions, and
more interests than the oft-discussed federal laws .... State

law must be viewed as a major functional program in order to
understand the breadth and scope of environmental law. As
environmental law reaches maturity, practitioners and scholars have recognized that much of the "action" is really occurring in state law.28
Consequently, strategies borne at these levels will have been battletested and are more likely to have been refined and made workable
than those hatched far from the front lines.
27 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 6.01[1] (Sheldon M.
Novick et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter 1 LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION] (noting the

almost total emphasis on federal environmental law found in treatises, law review articles,
and popular publications); David L. Markell, A How-To Guide to the Practiceof Environmental
Law, 2 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 360, 364 (1993) (book review) (noting that the same is true for
environmental casebooks including, by way of example, JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS 0.
McGARITY, THE LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2d ed. 1992); ROGER W. FINDLEY &
DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: CAsEs AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1992); ROBERT V..
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992)). Professor
Ringquist identifies the same phenomenon among political scientists: 'IR]esearch into state
politics, government, and policy receives too low a priority and too few resources in political
science." RiNGQuisT, supra note 14, at 9.
28 1 LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 27, § 6.01[l]. The importance of state
environmental regulation is demonstrated by the fact that states initiate far more
enforcement actions and conduct far more inspections than the federal government. See, e.g.,
E. Donald Elliott, Keynote Address, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,010, 10,011 (Jan.
1992) (noting that
about 70 percent of environmental enforcement cases are brought by the states.... EPA
provides only about 30 percent of the enforcement cases.
When you look at a measure such as the numbers of inspections conducted, the balance
is even more stark. The numbers for fiscal [year] 1988 reflect that over 200,000
inspections were being performed by the states. EPA performs 10,000, and its contractors
perform another 12,000. The states are performing 90 percent of the inspections.).
Professor Ringquist observes that "over the past fifteen years, many states have been far more
active in controlling pollution than the federal government. By focusing most of our attention
on federal efforts at environmental protection, we are missing some of the nation's most
important and innovative efforts at pollution control." RiNoQtnsT, supra note 14, at 4.
This reality suggests the limited relevance of one rationale for centralizing authority, a
presumed lack of expertise at "lower levels." See Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating
Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 867, 889 (1994); Markell, supra note 23, at 1077-79 (stating that Congress
should delegate more responsibility to those states that have shown they are competent to
handle such delegation).
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Because the damage resulting from innovations "gone awry" is
less significant, or at least more localized, if the innovations occur at
the state level rather than at the federal level, the federal government should welcome and indeed actively encourage state innovations. As Justice Brandeis pointed out in his famous dissent in New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann in 1932, "liltis one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
29
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
Tied in with many of the reasons listed above, there is a final reason why the federal government should pay special attention to state
and local governments' efforts in determining how best to "reinvent"
itself in terms of environmental regulation. The conservative nature
of bureaucracy, combined with the reality that the nature of innovation is inherently problematic, counsels in favor of looking for what
works, rather than reinventing the wheel at the federal level. Traveling through uncharted territory without a roadmap makes it difficult to find one's way, and the fact that innovation and risk taking
tend to be discouraged, not encouraged, in large bureaucratic organizations such as the EPA exacerbates this problem.30
29 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). While, as previously noted, this
Article does not focus directly on the issue of the appropriate shape of our federal system, see
supra note 10, Justice Brandeis's sentiments argue for a strong bias towards "delegating
down" authority from the federal government to the states. In a recent article, Professor
Daniel Farber urged the same result for a different reason. He urged that we need to shift
from conceptualizing environmental problems in static terms to viewing them using a more
dynamic model because of, inter alia, the enormous lack of information that affects our
thinking. Farber, supra note 23, at 798. Professor Farber recommended greater
decentralization of authority based on the idea that such a structure will be more adaptable
and better able to change. Id. Creating or fostering state capability to handle such
responsibility obviously is a key step. Cf. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422
(W.D. Wash. 1991) (requiring the EPA to promulgate Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL),
under the Clean Water Act, water pollution limits in Alaska, when Alaska failed to fulfill its
statutory duty to do so over a ten year period), aff'd 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994); Wood, supra
note 25, at B9 (asserting that the State of Oregon is incompetent to fulfill its duties under the
Clean Water Act).
30 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUcRACY 221 (1989) (noting the resistance of bureaucratic
institutions to innovation); Farber, supra note 23, at 798 ("Large hierarchies are not famous
for their ability to respond quickly and effectively to change."); Lazarus, supra note 2 at 311,
313 (noting that "combinations of institutional forces have... seriously frustrated from the
outset the ... [EPA's] development and implementation of federal environmental protection
policy"). In addition to its immense size, a number of flaws in our federal government counsel
against relying too much on the federal government to determine, on its own, how best to
reshape our environmental regulatory scheme. Among others, Vice President Gore's report,
NationalPerformance Review, notes, "Distrust between executive and legislative branches is
one of the major reasons for legislation that is overly restrictive, too detailed or poorly
conceived or drafted." IMPROvING REGULATORY SYSTE Ms, supra note 3, at 66. This complaint is
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For all of these reasons, as the federal government embarks on its
effort to "reinvent government" (to borrow Vice President Gore's
phrase) in terms of improving the environmental regulatory paradigm, a fundamental tenet of its strategy should be to look to state
experience for guidance on which path it should take.31 The federal
government should be investing in, encouraging, and learning about
the states' experiences in developing strategies to address these issues. As a final note, a side benefit of a federal government decision
to acknowledge clearly the value of state experiences in this way is
that doing so will inevitably help to improve the state/federal relationship. Such improvement would be welcome and beneficial. As
the EPA's current Assistant Administrator for the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA) put it after summarizing a
state offical's compliment concerning a recently developed EPA
Clean Air Act enforcement policy: "Most of us would agree that such
praise from a state official to a federal official is as rare as it is picturesque However, that is exactly the kind of state/federal cooperation I want to encourage for the future."32
Looking primarily to New York's experience, the remainder of this
Article discusses several specific innovative approaches that states
recently have pioneered or developed to strengthen environmental
regulation in three of the areas that many have targeted in criticizing the federal regime. Section II discusses experiments focused on
echoed by the National Academy of Public Administration, which recently concluded that
"[t]he outright confrontation and increasingly competitive relationship between the two
branches has a high cost: a political system more and more unresponsive to national problems
and unaccountable to the American people for addressing those problems." PANEL ON
CONGRESS & THE ExEcurIVE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBUC ADMIN., BEYOND DISTRUST:
BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE ExEcUTrvE 2-3 (1992). Another systemic
problem derives from Congress's structure. Lazarus, supra note 7, at 211 (noting the unwieldy
nature of congressional oversight of the EPA activity: "Most committees can find a nexus
between their assigned jurisdiction and an aspect of EPA's work. At present, at least eleven
standing House and nine standing Senate committees and up to 100 of their subcommittees
share jurisdiction over EPA.").
One issue that this Article does not address is the extent to which EPA's regional offices act
as "laboratories." Recent developments suggest that research into this area might prove
fruitful. Two EPA Regions Plan Multimedia Restructuringfor Early 1995, ENVIRONMENTAL

PoL'Y ALERT, Oct. 26, 1993, at 37 [hereinafter Multimedia Restructuring].
31 NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1, at ii. The federal government should do
so in addition to, and in many cases instead of, "inventing the wheel" itself in terms of
improving environmental regulation, as it sought to do in the Amoco oil refinery study. The

total cost of the Amoco project was $2.3 million and it took two years to complete. AMoco
STUDY, supra note 3, at ii. While such studies have their place, they clearly should not be the
EPA's primary strategy for determining what is wrong with contemporary environmental
regulation.
32 Steven A. Herman, CAA Section 507 Enforcement Response Policy, NAT'L ENVTL.
ENFORCEMENT J., Sept. 1994, at 10, 12.
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helping the government to prioritize among environmental concerns
and to understand and address environmental issues comprehensively. This section covers, among other experiments in this arena,
New York's effort to fundamentally revamp the organizational structure, and change the culture, of its environmental regulatory agency,
the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). By creating
a multimedia Pollution Prevention Unit, the DEC has sought to
heighten the focus it gives to high volume polluters and to enhance
the agency's interaction with such polluters in a comprehensive,
rather than a piecemeal, fashion.3 3 Section III covers the creative

mechanisms that New York has developed to address the unfunded
mandates issue by sharing funding responsibility with local governments to address "environmental infrastructure" needs, such as
remediation of toxic waste sites.3 4 Finally, Section IV covers a series
of innovative programs that New York has developed to improve
compliance with the environmental laws by (1) strengthening the
pool of permittees in terms of their commitment to compliance,35 (2)
improving the State's compliance monitoring, 36 and (3) opening up
or democratizing the front end of the enforcement process.3 7 The
federal government should carefully review these experiments as it
continues its effort to reinvent itself.38
II.

EFFORTS

To

PRIORITIZE AND VIEW PROBLEMS

COMPREHENSIVELY 3 9

In its 1990 report Reducing Risk: Setting Prioritiesand Strategies
for Environmental Protection,4 ° the Science Advisory Board made
33 See infra notes 39-202 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 203-14 and accompanying text.

35 See infra notes 229-83 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 284-325 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 326-34 and accompanying text.
3s The need to strengthen the federal government's partnership with state and local
governments, suggested in this paper, is complemented by the need for the federal government
to learn from as many groups as possible-to be as "inclusive" as possible-in identifying
flaws in the existing environmental regulatory regime and in fashioning cures for these flaws.
As the forward to the combined EPA/Amoco Corporation innovative pollution prevention
project undertaken at Amoco Oil Company's Yorktown, Virginia refinery notes: "[A] central
belief of this Project [is] that developing effective solutions to complex environmental
management problems will take the best efforts of the many 'partners' in our society." Amoco
STUDY, supra note 3, at ii.
39 Copyright © 1994 by Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. Reprinted with permission from
Environmental Law in New York Newsletter by Arnold & Porter. All rights reserved. An
earlier version of Sections II and II.A appears as Shiftingfrom 'Mono-Media" to 'Multi-Media"
EnvironmentalRegulation in New York State, ENVMRONMENTAL L. N.Y., Nov. 1994, at 1.
40 REDUCING RIsI, supra note 3.
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two criticisms of the current federal environmental statutory regime: (1) it addresses environmental problems from a fragmented,
piecemeal perspective, and (2) it addresses environmental problems
in a reactive way rather than based on a systematic effort to prioritize among issues and tackle the worst problems first.41 The Board
also criticized the media-specific bureaucratic structure that has
grown up around this balkanized statutory structure.4 2
The following statement in the Board's report captures the first
two concerns:
As different environmental problems were identified,.., new
laws were passed to address each new problem. However, the
tactics and goals of the different laws were neither consistent
nor coordinated, even if the pollutants to be controlled were
the same.
The environment is an interrelated whole, and society's environmental protection efforts should be integrated as well.
Integration in this case means that government agencies
should assess the range of environmental problems of concern
and then target protective efforts at the problems that seem to
be the most serious.43
41 Id. at 1. As Reducing Risk reflects, environmental laws were traditionally enacted on a
piecemeal basis to address specific problems. For example, the Clean Water Act was enacted
in 1972 to address certain causes of pollution of the nation's waters. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1988 & Supp. 1993). The Clean Air Act was adopted in 1970 to regulate air pollution. 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. 1993).
42 REDUCING RISK, supra note 3, at 1. Media-specific or program-specific bureaucratic
structures were created at both the national and state levels to administer these focused
statutory schemes. At the national level, for example, the EPA created an Office of Water and
an Office of Air and Radiation. The same is true at the state level. The New York DEC has a
Division of Water and a Division of Air Resources.
43 Id. The ICMA Environmental Mandates Task Force has voiced similar concerns about
the EPA's failure to prioritize among risks:
Too often EPA targets enforcement actions without regard to other sources of pollution
that may be causing equal or greater harm to the environment. Under Superfund, a small
town in Wisconsin faces the prospect of paying over $50 million to clean up two landfills
that may be contaminating a creek. Yet even after those sites are cleaned up, the creek
will still be contaminated by pollution from three other landfills, a golf course, airport, and
agricultural lands that drain into the creek. A regional plan would evaluate all of these
sources and decide what priority to give each instead of spending extraordinary amounts
on two sources while ignoring the others.
Letter from the International City/County Management Association to Carol Browner,
Administrator, U.S. EPA (Mar. 5, 1993), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL Crry/CouNTY
MANAGEMENT AsS'N, ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATES TASK FORCE MEETING 5 (Mar. 5, 1993)
[hereinafter MEETING NoTEs].
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The Board described the evolution of the current balkanized bureaucratic structure as follows:
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established
as the primary Federal agency responsible for implementing
the nation's environmental laws. EPA then evolved an administrative structure wherein each program was primarily
responsible for implementing specific laws. Consequently, the
efforts of the different programs rarely were coordinated, even
if they were attempting to control different aspects of the
same environmental problem.44
Many other commentators have echoed the Board's three criticisms
of the current environmental statutory regime and the bureaucratic
structure for administering it. As William Futrell, President of the
Environmental Law Institute, put it in a recent -article:
In the last quarter century, Congress has passed scores of
statutes piecemeal in reaction to highly publicized crises...,
with insufficient regard for how the specific . . .response[s]

melded into a coherent environmental management system.
As a result, many environmental laws express different-and
sometimes conflicting-goals, without clear priorities....
This "piecemealism" has resulted in a checkerboard pattern
of conflicting, confused overregulation for some activities and
gaps where major environmental insults go unchecked by the
law ....
...

After a generation of intense legislative and judicial ac-

tivity, environmental law is more fragmented than ever.45
In fact, in recent years, a rare consensus seems to have emerged
among environmental professionals in government, the private sector, and the environmental and academic communities that U.S. environmental legislation has historically been fragmented rather
than comprehensive and that we need to change this fragmented
structure and approach problems more systematically and comprehensively.46 In a recent Loyola Law Review symposium on the past
twenty-five years of environmental regulation, several commentators identified the fragmentary nature of environmental law as an
44 REDUCING RISK, supra note 3, at 1.

Futrell, supra note 17, at 17. For a discussion of the fragmented nature of environmental
policy making in terms of the division of responsibility among the various federal actors, see
Lazarus, supra note 28, at 876.
46 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text; infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
45
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impediment to effective regulation of pollution. 47 For example, Professor Kenneth Manaster of Santa Clara University discussed the
balkanized nature of environmental law and quoted with approval a
statement by two other authors that the "'EPA must break out of its
monomedia myopia, adopting instead a true cross-media focus.' "4s
Among the multitude of problems stemming from the traditionally
fragmented approach to environmental legislation and regulation,
three warrant mention: (1) such a legislative structure greatly complicates the effort to prioritize among problems and to target the
worst problems first;49 (2) it often gives inadequate attention to
transfers of pollution from one medium to another; 0 and (3) this
structure has produced fragmented organizational structures in the
regulatory agencies charged with implementing these laws, leading
to inefficiency on the part of the regulator and the regulated alike.
The EPA has acknowledged the flaws inherent in such a balkanized
approach: "Media-specific approaches often create duplication
among program offices.... The need to tackle more complex issues
through prevention and control, in a more 'holistic' fashion, appears
to require a new organizational approach. As EPA strives to solve
more complex issues, its current structure works to inhibit or impede success."51
Two EPA employees similarly criticized the EPA's current organizational structure and its impact on regulated parties:
Is there a better way to organize the EPA? The agency has
long been structured according to media-air, water, landoften limiting individual programs to a specific environmental
problem. The result-isolated, sometimes fragmented, programs-often leads to cases where an industry is subject to
repetitive or even competing regulations from various EPA
offices.5 2
47 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 28, at 876; see generally Symposium, Twenty-Five Years of
Environmental Regulation, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 785 (1994).
48 Kenneth A. Manaster, Ten Paradoxes of Environmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 917,

939 n.51 (1994) (quoting Daniel A. Mazmanian & David L. Morell, EPA: Coping with the New
PoliticalEconomic Order, 21 ENVTL. L. 1477, 1481 (1991)).
49 Id. at 938.

50 See Amoco

STUDY,

supra note 3, at iv, 9, 18.

51 U.S. EPA, EPA-210/R-93-004, CREATING A U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS, PHASE I REPORT NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEw 7
(Dec. 1993) [hereinafter PHASE I REPORT].
52 Wendy Cleland-Hamnett & Joe Retzer, CrossingAgency Boundaries, ENVTL. F., Mar.-

Apr. 1993, at 17, 17. The EPA's institutional position is much the same. PHASE I REPORT,
supra note 51, at 7.
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There are signs that environmental regulators at the federal level
have begun to respond to this call for coordinated and prioritized,
rather than piecemeal, approaches. An August 1994 article reports
that the "EPA is, for the first time, organizing its budget around a
set of environmental goals rather than statutory mandates" 3 in order to gain the flexibility needed to approach environmental issues
comprehensively. 'The EPA's recently announced "Common Sense
Initiative," which is, in EPA Administrator Browner's words, "a fundamentally different system of environmental protection," 54 is intended to shift the EPA's perspective towards environmental
regulation from a media-specific approach to a more comprehensive
approach, at least as to the six industries that the initiative will
cover.5 1 Quoting from Administrator Browner again, the initiative
will "replace[ ] the pollutant-by-pollutant approach of the past with
an industry-by-industry approach of the future."5 6
According to one report on the Common Sense Initiative, both environmental and industry groups have applauded the EPA's decision
to shift its focus toward a more comprehensive and less piecemeal
approach. The president of the Chemical Manufacturers Association
is quoted as saying, "We think it is well worthwhile to explore holistic approaches to environmental policy making."s 7 An Environmental Defense Fund official is also cited as approving of the EPA's
change in focus, although he apparently qualified his endorsement
by "acknowledg[ing] that the effort could result in little more than
rhetoric."5 8
Despite this relatively positive gloss on progress toward moving
from mono-media to multimedia approaches at the national level,
the consensus appears to be that the federal government is at an
early stage of the learning curve and much remains to be done. AcOther observers and participants feel the same way. E.g., Markell, supra note 4, at 730

(describing local governments' views). Professor Richard J. Lazarus describes the fragmented
nature of environmental policy from a different perspective, notably the different perspectives
that different actors at the federal level such as the EPA and Congress have maintained
towards environmental issues, and the problems that fragmentation of this variety has

caused. Lazarus, supra note 7, at 230.
63 EPA To Write First 'Goals.Based'Budget for Fiscal Year 1996, ENVTL. POL'Y ALERT, Aug.

3, 1994, at 41. The article continues that the EPA's plan "will likely run into opposition in
Congress," quoting a House source as saying that the new plan "could be a big problem." Id.
54 Browner Says Six Industries To Participate in New Approach to Environmental

Regulation, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 967, at 525 (July 22, 1994).
5 Id. The six industries are: (1) automobile manufacturing, (2) computers and electronics,
(3) iron and steel, (4) metal finishing and plating, (5) petroleum refining, and (6) printing. Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 526.
5s8
Id.
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cording to one EPA official, even in the enforcement area in which
the EPA has made considerable efforts to integrate its activities, "institutional and cultural barriers" have frustrated the EPA's achieving success. 5 9 This EPA official notes that "progress has been slow
in implementing a permanent cross-media enforcement planning
process." 60

A recent article reports that the EPA has also encountered significant problems in "making multimedia rulemaking a standard practice."61 The article cites a member of the EPA's Effluent Guidelines
Task Force as stating that "a lot of barriers" exist to multimedia regulations.62 Among other problems, the article identifies "procedural
differences among various offices."6" The article also quotes the
Task Force member as saying that "[elverybody is pumped" about
pursuing multimedia approaches, but "there needs to be a lot of
fixing."64

A recent report in an environmental newsletter makes the same
point regarding the EPA's pollution prevention efforts.65 This newsletter reports that both "[e]nvironmentalists and industry represent69 Fontaine, supra note 5, at 37.
60 Id. at 86. Even in the area of enforcement, states have been in the vanguard of seeking
integrated ways to approach problems. The Massachusetts Blackstone project is one example.
Manik Roy & Lee Dillard, Toxic Use Reduction in Massachusetts: The Blackstone Project, 40 J.
Am & WAsTE MGMT. ASS'N 1368 (1990) (integrated compliance effort, in which Massachusetts
used cross-program inspection teams to inspect 26 metal-intensive manufacturing facilities in
the Worcester, Mass. area operating in the Blackstone River basin). Nevertheless, through
multimedia enforcement screening and other strategies, the EPA has begun to make some
progress in this area. Fontaine, supra note 5, at 63. Further, in June 1991, the EPA's
Enforcement Headquarters office created a multimedia coordination team. Id. at 37, 80. And
the EPA has created a number of "cluster" committees which "consist of teams of staff and
managers from relevant EPA program offices that meet on a regular basis to integrate
formally separate activities with respect to specific industries, environmental resources, and
other significant areas that are a concern of the EPA's regulatory programs." Id. at 81.
61 PollutionPrevention,Multimedia Key to FutureEffluent Guidelines, ENvTL. POLy' ALERT,
Aug. 31, 1994, at 15, 15.
62 Id.

63 Id.
64

1d.

65 EPA Pollution Prevention Efforts Critized for Lack of Coordination, ENVTL. POL'Y ALERT,

May 25, 1994, at 35. In a recent publication, an EPA official makes the same point:
By virtue of EPA's program organization, the regulatory process is virtually always
focused on developing single statute or media-specific rules. The Agency is simply not
well positioned to look at regulations along industry or sector lines. Thus, at any given
time, the air, water, and waste programs all may be in various stages of regulatory
development with respect to a given industry (such as pulp and paper) or with respect to a
specific pollutant (such as lead or nitrogen). Yet, the various program offices are not
working together.
Nancy B. Firestone, PracticeBefore the EPA, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAw PRACTICE GUIDE: STATE

AND FEDERAL LAw 1, 31 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1994).
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atives are expressing growing concern that EPA's broad-based
pollution prevention initiatives lack coordination." 66 It states further that "[industry sources say that contrary to EPA's rhetoric,
they have seen little evidence that EPA is committed to addressing
pollution prevention from a multimedia standpoint."6 7 According to
the newsletter, the EPA officials "reject this charge, contending it is
premature to judge the agency's efforts at this time."68
While the EPA moves through this transitional period in its effort
to prioritize among environmental concerns and approach environmental issues comprehensively, a look inside Justice Brandeis's "laboratories of democracy" 69 reveals that the states are conducting
extensive experiments on these fronts. For example, between 1989
and 1992, twenty-six states enacted legislation aimed at toxics use
reduction (TUR) across all media.7 ° The Massachusetts Toxics Use
Reduction Act (MTURA), 7 ' in one commentator's view, "perhaps the
strongest of such laws," was enacted to "reduc[e] toxic waste generated by fifty percent by 1997, relative to 1987 levels, while sustaining and promoting the competitive advantages of
Massachusetts's businesses."72 The MTURA requires large quantity
toxic users to develop a toxics use reduction plan and file a summary
of the plan with the Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Protection.73
The New York "laboratory" has also been busy conducting experiments. The remainder of this section discusses three changes that
New York State has made in its approach to regulating pollution in
an effort to improve its ability to prioritize among environmental
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. The newsletter also notes that some EPA sources believe that pollution prevention
efforts within single media offices have been largely successful. Id. at 36.
69 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
70 Stenzel, supra note 24, at 13.
71 MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 211, §§ 1-23 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
72 Stenzel, supra note 24, at 14.
73 Id. The MTURA also requires the Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Protection to: "(1) conduct all compliance enforcement work for all environmental statutes on a
multi-media basis, (2) make source reduction the preferred approach to compliance with all
environmental regulations, (3) identify and eliminate barriers to source reduction, and (4)
eliminate any duplicative or contradictory reporting requirements." ELI/OTA REPORT, supra
note 21, at 80.
Texas's Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) recently adopted a program
that uses voluntary means to reduce generation of multimedia waste. Id. at 108-10.
According to the ELL/OTA report, while Texas is early in the life of the program, "initial
results look promising, with 76 of the. top 100" Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) reporters
participating and pledging to reduce hazardous waste generation by 57% and "toxic releases
by 62% by the year 2000." Id. at 110.
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concerns and address such concerns comprehensively. First, it discusses the DEC's multimedia pollution prevention initiative which
addresses the three concerns discussed above.14 This initiative
charts a course of addressing environmental issues in a comprehensive rather than a piecemeal fashion; it establishes criteria for prioritizing among the environmental issues that warrant attention;
and it revamps the DEC's organizational structure in order to "break
down organizational barriers" and change the agency's "institutional
culture" to facilitate a comprehensive approach to issues. Second,
the section discusses an innovative effort within one media program
that is designed to improve prioritization.7 5 Finally, the section discusses a program which would create greater flexibility in the regulatory regime as a strategy for improving prioritization.76
A. Multimedia/PollutionPrevention (M2P2).
Perhaps the most significant innovation the DEC has undertaken
in recent years in its administration of the environmental laws involves its effort both to prioritize among and to approach environmental issues from a holistic, rather than a piecemeal perspective.
While these efforts are reflected in a wide variety of the DEC activities, the Department's recent "institutional makeover" through, inter
alia, its creation of a Pollution Prevention Unit best demonstrates
this commitment to changing its orientation.7 7
As noted above, 78 one problem stemming from the traditional, balkanized organizational structure is a failure to view environmental
problems holistically or comprehensively. 79 A wide variety of commentators have highlighted this problem and urged the need for improving the integration of the environmental regulatory scheme.80
74 See infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 41-42
(listing the three concerns).
75 See infra notes 125-55 and accompanying text.
76 See infra notes 156-202 and accompanying text.
77 Then Commissioner Thomas C. Jorling authorized establishment of this unit in July
1992. See NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, ORGANi ATION AND DELEGATION
MEMORANDUM No. 92-94: POLLUTION PREMENTION INITIATIVE 2 (July 23, 1992) [hereinafter
0 & D MEMORANDUM No. 92-24].
78 See supra text accompanying notes 40-52.

79 Among other problems, this structure has complicated "horizontal coordination," i.e.,
coordination between and among programs. See Cleland-Hamnett & Retzer, supra note 52, at
21.; Futrell, supra note 17, at 19-20; cf. Avtex Fibers Hearing, supra note 15, at 22-23
(statement of R. Claire Guthrie, Deputy Attorney General, Office of Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Virginia).
80 See, e.g., -REDUCING RIsK, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that the EPA's efforts have been
fragmented and inconsistent); WATER POLLUTION MONITORING, supra note 5, at 18;
ALTERNATIVE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at 21; Clarence Davies, Some Thoughts on
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The importance of this structural flaw is captured by the fact that,
as the Amoco study concluded, "[plollutant release management frequently involves the transfer or conversion of pollutants from one
form or medium to another.""' The Amoco study goes on to make
the obvious, but often ignored, point that "[s]ince human health and
environmental consequences vary from one medium to another,'
viewing a release problem in the context of net environmental effects
is essential to developing more sound solutions."82
Environmental regulators in New York, as in the rest of the country, have begun to shift from a piecemeal approach to regulation to
approaching environmental problems and their sources more comprehensively. In July 1992, New York's DEC altered its institutional structure with the aim of approaching environmental
concerns in a more comprehensive manner. Among other actions,
the Department created a multimedia Pollution Prevention Unit
whose function is to help the Department approach environmental
challenges from an integrated, comprehensive perspective.8 3
Through this revamping of its institutional structure, the DEC has
begun to break out of the somewhat narrowly focused, media-specific
approach to addressing environmental problems that characterized
government environmental regulation at the federal and state levels
in the 1970s and 1980s. Further, through the Department's decision
to focus multimedia regulatory attention on the major sources of air,
water, and land-based pollution in the State, the "400/95" facilities, 4 the DEC appears to be responding to the concern that the
traditional piecemeal regulatory approach failed to prioritize among
environmental concerns and ignored transfers of pollution.
Implementing Integration, 22 ENvTL. L. 139, 140 n.2 (1992) (citing the second draft of the
Conservation Foundation's proposed Environmental Protection Act).
81 Amoco STUDY, supra note 3, at iv.
82 Id. at 18. The EPA makes the same point in its recent report, Deposition of Air
Pollutants: First Report to Congress: "EPA recognizes that pollutants are transferred
continuously between air, water, and land and that, to adequately address pollution problems,
multimedia, multiagency approaches must be explored." OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING &
STANDARDS RESEARCH, U.S. EPA, EPA-453/R-93-055, DEPOSrION OF AIR POLLUTANTS TO THE
GREAT WATERS

74 (May 1994).

83 See 0 & D MEMORANDUM No. 92-24, supra note 77, at 2.

s4 The "400/95" facilities, discussed in more detail below, infra notes 92-97 and
accompanying text, are so named based on TRI data that "reveals that approximately 400
existing facilities produce nearly 95% of the hazardous waste generated and 95% of the toxic
discharges to air and water in New York State." NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL.
CONSERVATION,
ORGANIZATION AND DELEGATION MEMORANDUM
No. 92-13: POLLUTION
REDUCTION AND INTEGRATED FACILITY MANAGEMENT 1 (Mar. 30, 1992) [hereinafter 0 & D
MEMORANDUM No. 92-13].
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In a July 1992 memorandum, then DEC Commissioner Thomas C.
Jorling expressed his view that the Department could become more
efficient and produce improved environmental protection "if review~s] of pollution sources are coordinated with respect to their effects on all environmental media."85 The Commissioner revamped
both the agency's headquarters and its regional organizational
structure to facilitate the DEC's ability to pursue such coordinated
approaches. In the July 1992 memorandum he announced the creation of a Headquarters Multi-Media Pollution Prevention Unit that
would include up to 17 staff members. 8 He.placed the Unit under
the direction of the Deputy Commissioner for the Office of Environmental Quality.8 7 Placement of the Unit within the Office of Environmental Quality was important because this office contains the
DEC's major regulatory divisions-i.e., those divisions with responsibility for the air, water, and Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA)88 programs.
Commissioner Jorling also directed that each of the DEC's nine
regional offices refine its structure to ensure institutional support for
multimedia or "inter-program" coordination. The July 1992 memorandum instructed the nine regional directors to "develop an organizational structure.., that achieves the goals of pollution prevention,
inter-program coordination and increased efficiency. This structure
should incorporate a senior-level staff person who will integrate and
coordinate program activities."89
In sum, by changing its organizational structure, the DEC has
taken a large step to facilitate its pursuit of a multimedia approach.
Though these structural changes are significant, they do not represent a truly radical solution. On either end of the continuum, possible organizational structures either: (1) retain the traditional,
existing, media-specific structure but require additional coordination between and among ultimately single program-oriented staff; or
(2) discard the single media programs and completely restructure
the agency. The DEC has done neither. Instead, it has apparently
recognized that merely requiring coordination among staff who are
accountable for single media responsibilities is unlikely to be enough
to produce a change in focus.90 As a result, the DEC has institution85 0 & D MEMORANDUM No. 92-24,
86 Id.
87 Id.
88

supra note 77, at 1.

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. 1993).

89 0 & D MEMORANDUM No. 92-24, supra note 77, at 2-3.
90 Commissioner Jorling's decision to do more than require coordination among existing

programs presumably stemmed in part from his view that the DEC needed a "cultural" as well
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alized a multimedia perspective at both the headquarters and regional levels. Perhaps to avoid likely confusion and disruption, the
Department has chosen not to turn the agency's structure on its
head by disbanding the program divisions.
It is impossible to know at this point whether the DEC's ongoing
experiment with its "middle of the continuum" restructuring is the
ideal organizational framework, or even if such an ideal framework
exists. Further analysis of the appropriateness of the changes that
the DEC has made to its organizational structure will have to await
evaluation of the progress that the agency makes through its multimedia efforts. This section will now turn to the details of these
efforts.
In addition to creating the Pollution Prevention Unit and refining
the regional offices' structure to facilitate approaching environmental issues from a multimedia perspective, the DEC has established
criteria for determining which sources of pollution should receive
priority multimedia attention. In an October 1993 guidance memorandum, the Department's Pollution Prevention Unit provided "criteria to assist regions in selecting and ranking facilities targeted
under the multimedia pollution prevention initiative."91
The DEC's guidance memoranda reflect that the key criterion the
DEC plans to use to select facilities warranting multimedia treatment is the toxics release inventory (TRI) data on the volume of pollution generated and released in the state.92 This information is
collected and compiled pursuant to the 1986 federal Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).9 3 As the
first comprehensive database of releases of toxic substances, the TRI
represents an important first step in inventorying the pollution that
is being created in the State and determining the
relative contribu94
loading.
pollution
this
to
sources
tion of various
as an "organizational" change to make the transition from a single media piecemeal approach

to one that is more holistic in its approach to environmental regulation. 0 & D MEMoRANDUM
No. 92-24, supra note 77, at 1-2.
91 POLLUTION PREVENTION UNIT, NEW YORK STATE DEP'T ENVTL. CONSERVATION, TECHNICAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM No. 8010-93-02: GUIDANCE AND CRrrERIA FOR

SELECTION OF MULTI-MEDIA FACILITIES 1 (Oct. 13, 1993) [hereinafter TAGM No. 8010-93-02].
92 Id. at 2.

93 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988). A recent EPA/Amoco study observed that "[tihe TRI
data has become the de facto national release inventory." Amoco STUDY, supra note 3, at 6.
94 Although useful, the TRI has limitations as a planning tool. AMoco STUDY, supra note 3,

at 6-7. Among other things, it does not cover all significant sources of pollution located in the
state. The Amoco study indicates that for the Virginia facility, the TRI report "covers only 9
percent of the total hydrocarbons released, and only 2.4 percent of the total releases to all
media." Id. It also does not cover all chemicals of concern. See, e.g., id. at iv ("he Toxic
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Using its TRI database, the DEC has determined that in New
York State, 400 existing facilities produce nearly 95% of the hazardous waste generated and 95% of the toxic discharges to air and water
in the state.9 5 The Department's plan is to conduct multimedia reviews of each of these 400 facilities by the year 2000.96 The October
1993 guidance memorandum indicates that in the Department's initial effort during 1993-94 (the first year of the multimedia initiative), "each Region selected a minimum of 10% of the number of
facilities that appear on their portion of the 400/95 list"97 for review

from a multimedia perspective.
The October 1993 guidance memorandum makes it clear that facilities other than the TRI "top 400" may warrant multimedia attention as well, providing that "[flacilities that do not appear on the
400/95 list may be proposed [for multimedia action] if they rank
highly using the criteria provided below."9 The guidance memorandum lists, inter alia, the following additional criteria for identifying
such facilities: (1) the extent to which the facility engages in activities that are regulated under more than one program; (2) quantities
of toxics generated and/or released; (3) environmental and public
health impacts; (4) compliance history and enforcement issues; (5)
known and potential remediation problems; (6) corporate attitude
and commitment; and (7) receipt of hazardous waste or substances
from off-site for recycling, treatment, or disposal.99 The DEC has
indicated its commitment to conduct multimedia pollution prevention (M2P2) evaluations of "all facilities of concern" by the year
2000.100 Such "facilities of concern" appear to, include all 400 of the
Release Inventory database does not adequately characterize releases from this Refinery."). In
addition, TRI data merely provides "an approximate inventory" of specified chemicals released
to the environment. Id. at 7. Finally, TRI data is not a basis for a meaningful evaluation of
risks because, as the Amoco report points out, "it does not define the facility's relationship to
nearby populations and ecosystems." Id.
96 0 & D MEMORANDUM No. 92-13, supra note 84, at 1; see supra note 84.
96 TAGM No. 8010-93-02, supra note 91, at 1; Langdon Marsh, Introductory Speech: An
Integrated Approach to Pollution Prevention, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK STATE SIXTH

ANNUAL POUTOmN PREVENTION CONFERENCE 9, 10 (New York State Dep't Envtl. Conservation
ed., 1994).
97 TAGM No. 8010-93-02, supra note 91, at 1.
98 Id.

99 Id. at 2-4.
100 Id. at 1. In this Article "M2P2" means the Multimedia Pollution Prevention Initiative
which is designed to implement and coordinate multimedia pollution prevention activities at
the "400/95 list of facilities" within New York State. POLLUTION PREVENTION UNIT, NEW YORK
STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE
MEMORANDUM No. 8010-93-01: THE MULTI-MEDIA POLLUTION PREVENTION PROCESS - How IT

WoRKS 2 (Oct. 3, 1993) [hereinafter TAGM 8010-93-011.
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400/95 facilities, as well as any other facilities that warrant multimedia attention based on health and environmental concerns and
the other criteria listed above.
One final salient point concerns the DEC's implementation strategy for regulating parties in a multimedia fashion. To facilitate the
regions' management of their multimedia workloads as efficiently as
possible, the regions were directed to select facilities with an eye toward ensuring an overall balance of responsibilities among different
programs "so as not to overload any one area."101
In sum, the DEC's overall strategy seems to be a sensible one. The
agency has established a clear ultimate objective of evaluating all
significant facilities in the state within a relatively short time frame,
by the year 2000. Further it has established a systematic approach
to prioritizing its treatment of such facilities based on both external
factors (e.g., the degree of risk that such facilities pose) and internal
factors (e.g., the Department's own resource constraints).
The issue of identifying external factors that will provide the basis
for selecting facilities for multimedia review deserves one comment.
Many states have conducted comprehensive "comparative risk" analyses to rank or prioritize environmental concerns. 10 2 The DEC effectively has used the TRI data as a proxy for this process. The benefits
and disadvantages of comparative risk analysis are currently the
subject of some debate. 0 To the extent that a consensus exists that
major TRI pollution sources are within the universe of facilities that
deserve multimedia attention, one clear benefit of New York's decision essentially to dispense with process in establishing priorities
has been the rapid start-up of its multimedia review effort. As noted
above, the DEC's multimedia program was "operationalized" almost
101 As noted below, the selection of the DEC facility coordinator is based on the program

that has the primary responsibility for the facility. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying
text. Accordingly, the different regions were also given the common sense advice to avoid
selecting facilities for which a single program (e.g., air) had the major regulatory
responsibility. TAGM No. 8010-93-01, supra note 100, at 3.
102 For a list of state projects with completed comparative risk rankings, see Projects with
Completed Rankings, COMP. RISK BULL. (Northeast Ctr. for Comparative Risk, Vt. Law Sch.),

May-June 1994, at 8.
103 Compare Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming EnvironmentalLaw: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 CoLuM. L. REv. 562, 565-75, 629-33 (1992) (arguing that,

although comparative risk analysis might be broadly valuable, it does little to address "such
noncommodity values as human health, aesthetics, and responsibility toward nonhuman
species and ecosystems") with Risk Heading to the Supreme Court? A Closer Look at Breyer's

Breaking the Vicious Circle, CoMP. RISK BuLL. (Northeast Ctr. for Comparative Risk, Vt. Law
Sch.), May-June 1994, at 4-5 (critiquing Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer's views of
environmental law and comparative risk analysis, and his argument that current techniques
lead to "tunnel vision" and irrational priorities).
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373

immediately, 10 4 with the nine DEC regions collectively being
charged with pursuing multimedia reviews of approximately 40 of
the major TRI sources during the first year of the program. In short,
the availability of and the decision to use the TRI data enabled the
Department to begin its multimedia initiative once it made the decision to move its regulatory efforts in that direction.
Under the October 13, 1993 guidance memorandum, once a DEC
Regional office identifies the local facilities to be evaluated under the
multimedia initiative, the regional multimedia pollution prevention
coordinator selects a facility manager/coordinator for each covered
facility as well as a DEC team for that facility, based on the "primary
regulatory and environmental issues associated with the facility." 10 5
For example, as the guidance memorandum points out, "ifthe majority of releases causing environmental concerns are through wastewater discharges, the facility manager/coordinator should be
selected from the Water program." 106 The DEC's next steps include
(1) notifying the targeted facility that it intends to address the facility from an integrated, multimedia perspective; (2) developing an action plan for the facility that includes scheduling activities such as a
pre-inspection meeting, the inspection itself, and postinspection follow up, along with technical support for any subsequent enforcement; and (3) inspecting the facility. 10 7
The October 13, 1993 guidance memorandum 0 8 and January 19,
1994 guidance memorandum10 9 both elaborate on the Department's
strategy for conducting multimedia inspections. In terms of inspection objectives, "[t]he overall goal of the multi-media inspection program is to examine the entire facility at one point in time or within a
confined time frame employing good communications among programs to develop a comprehensive integrated strategy."110 The guidance memoranda explain the benefits that the DEC expects to
realize by conducting multimedia inspections:
Traditionally, programs have established single medium/
program inspection schedules. This resulted in comprehen104
105
106
107

See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
TAGM No. 8010-93-01, supra note 100, at 2-3.
Id. at 3.

Id.
108 TAGM No. 8010-93-01, supra note 100.
109 POLLUTION PREVENTION UNIT, NEW YORK STATE DEPT OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM No. 8010-93-06: THE MULTI-MEDIA
INSPECTION MODEL (Jan. 19, 1994) [hereinafter TAGM No. 8010-93-06].
110 Id. at Attachment 1, at 2; see TAGM No. 8010-93-01, supra note 100, at 2-4
(emphasizing the need for planning and coordination during facility inspections).
TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATIVE
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sive inspections within each program. Although, inspectors
generally performed inspections with an eye to programs
other than their own, there was no formal procedure for
multi-media observations.... The [multi-media inspection]
program is intended to result in several important
advantages:
No significant problems are overlooked.
The relationships among releases become well understood.
Releases into one medium are not shifted to another with little or no overall environmental improvement.1 1 '
The DEC has made several policy judgments concerning how these
inspections should be conducted. First, the DEC has rejected the notion of creating "super inspectors" who would be completely knowledgeable about every regulatory program. 11 2 Instead, it has
developed checklists for inspectors to use. The agency notes in the
guidance memorandum that "[t]he emphasis for multi-media inspections is on overall familiarity with program goals and procedures,
and accurate and complete observation and recording of conditions."" 3 Second, such inspections may be unannounced "as appropriate," or, if announced, "[g]enerally, facilities should receive no
114
more than 24 hours advance notice."
In terms of the nature of follow up when multimedia inspections
uncover significant violations, the DEC has not finalized a multimedia enforcement guidance memorandum. The October 1993 guidance memorandum states that the DEC intends to develop such a
document." 5 The DEC's Fourth Annual Enforcement Report, issued
in December 1993, indicates that the DEC's enforcement program
already has shifted from single-media approaches to multimedia approaches to a considerable extent:
The Department has recognized the increasing need to develop a more integrated, holistic approach to natural resource
management and environmental protection. Specifically, the
Department is shifting from a medium specific oriented regulation to a comprehensive approach which considers all avenues of release and exposure. The Department has
fundamentally changed its approach to enforcement by sup111 TAGM No. 8010-93-06, supra note 109, at Attachment 1, at 1-2. This guidance
memorandum lists several other advantages as well. Id.
112 See id. at Attachment 1, at 3 ("The Department inspectors are not expected to reach or
maintain an expert level of competence for all DEC programs.").
113 Id.

114 TAGM No. 8010-93-01, supra note 100, at 3.
115 Id. at 1.
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plementing its traditional single-media method and increasingly building a multimedia approach into all phases of
enforcement. The Department is bringing a multimedia perspective to bear on all appropriate facets of its enforcement
process from priority setting and inspection planning to case
prosecution and settlement. 116
Finally, to close the loop concerning the multimedia effort, the
DEC's regional offices are required to submit status reports on each
facility covered by the M2P2 effort as part of the region's monthly
reporting to the DEC Commissioner." 7 Further, the Pollution Prevention Unit is required to prepare an annual report to the Commissioner on all M2P2 facilities."' Thus, while it appears that much of
the multimedia work will occur in, and be directed from, the DEC's
nine regional offices, the agency has created at least two mechanisms to provide headquarters with both a timely and comprehensive picture of the status of the program. 1 9 Presumably, any
necessary adjustments can be made in response to the regions'
reports.
The DEC's effort in recent years to adopt an "integrated and comprehensive facility specific multimedia environmental management
approach" 20 has proceeded on two parallel tracks. On track one, as
the preceding discussion reveals, the DEC has both identified the
facilities to which it plans to give priority multimedia attention, and
significantly revamped its own institutional structure to facilitate
the agency's pursuing multimedia approaches to environmental
issues.
Track two is the DEC's initiative to promulgate regulations that
will create a multimedia pollution prevention planning process. In
August 1993, the DEC proposed multimedia regulations in proposed
Part 378, which recently expired on September 24, 1994 without being finalized.' 2 ' Nevertheless, because the DEC is likely to "try
again" at some point, and because these regulations ultimately will
play a central role in the Department's multimedia efforts, I briefly
summarize their proposed contents below.
116 NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,

FOURTH ANNUAL

REPORT TO

GOVERNOR MARIO M. CUOMO ON ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT (F.Y. 1992-1993) 1 (Dec. 1993)
[hereinafter FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT].
117 TAGM No. 8010-93-01, supra note 100, at 4.
118 Id.

119 Additionally, headquarters has a "consultation" role in the regions' selection of M2P2
facilities. Id. at 2.
120 Id. at 1.
121 N.Y. St. Reg., Aug. 4, 1993, at 18-22; N.Y. St. Reg., Mar. 9, 1994, at 46.
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Based on their draft form, the final regulations are likely to require facility plans to include at least the following six features: (1)
an evaluation of the "technical feasibility" and "economic practicability" of reducing the volume of waste and discharges; (2) waste reduction goals based on this evaluation; (3) a description of the program
that the facility will implement to achieve technically feasible and
economically practicable reductions; (4) a time schedule for implementing the reductions; (5) appropriate training to achieve the
goals; and (6) a method of measuring progress in waste reduction. 122
As noted, while the initial draft regulations likely provide some
sense of the ultimate content of Part 378, final analysis obviously
must await final promulgation.
As Justice Brandeis no doubt would have expected, New York
State's DEC appears to be somewhat more nimble than the federal
government, having restructured itself two years ago to improve its
1 23
ability to address environmental issues more comprehensively.
Whether the DEC's "institutional makeover" is a model worthy of
emulation at the federal level or by other states will depend on the
results of this experiment. The critical point for purposes of this Article is that the federal government should study how states such as
New York are approaching these difficult and challenging "transformation" or "transition" times in environmental regulation, and identify what works and what does not. The importance of the federal
government's need to evaluate these issues is highlighted by the
DEC view that change in the "regulatory culture" must occur at the
federal level if relatively "localized" efforts, such as those the DEC
12 4
has undertaken, are to succeed.

B. Improved "Single Media" Prioritization
The EPA's reinventing government report recommends, inter alia,
25
that the EPA improve prioritization in its permitting processes.1
This issue no doubt will be among many that a recently established
See id. at 18.
In 1992, the DEC began moving "from a media-specific focus toward an integrated and
comprehensive approach to environmental management." 0 & D MEMORANDUM No. 92-24,
122
123

supra note 77, at 1.
24 See id. at Attachment, at 1 ("We must work to refocus EPA's medium specific
mind-set ..... "). In its "reinventing government" report, the EPA recognized the need for an

internal "cultural" change, concluding that "the Agency's current culture must change,"
including "support[ing] cross-Agency and multi-disciplinary perspectives." PHASE I REPORT,
supra note 51, at RD-4.
125 Id. at PS-1, PS-4.
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EPA "Task Force,"' 26 known as the "Permits Improvement Team,"1 2 7
will address. The purpose of the Task Force is to "'examine means
to improve permit processes, while maintaining high quality enforceable permits.' "128
New York's State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(SPDES) permitting program for discharges of wastewater offers one
example of an effort to prioritize within the context of a single media
program. 129 The DEC has made a systematic effort to modify its permitting process so its resources are allocated to the issues of highest
30

priority.1

In 1992, the DEC's Division of Water adopted an "environmental,
benefit permit strategy" (EBPS) that enables the DEC to prioritize
its work more effectively by treating truly significant and less significant discharges of wastewater differently.' 3 1 As the DEC put it:
The Division of Water has begun using an Environmental
Benefit Permit Strategy ("EBPS") to manage the workload of
renewing existing SPDES permits. This new strategy represents a shift from reviewing permits in chronological order, as
they expire, to establishing priorities for reviewing permits
benefit that will be gained by
based on the environmental
13 2
modifying the permit.
Under the Clean Water Act, permits expire and must be renewed
every five years. 1 33 Prior to the development of the EBPS strategy,
the DEC comprehensively reviewed every permit when it came up
for renewal. This occurred regardless of whether the permit was for
126 EPA Establishes Task Force To Improve PermittingProcess, ENvTL. POL'Y ALERT, Aug. 3,
1994, at 44 [hereinafter Task Force].
127 More Public Involvement, Speedier Review Considered Key To Improving Permit
Programs, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1271, 1271 (Oct. 28, 1994); Multimedia Restructuring, supra
note 30, at 36.
128 Task Force, supra note 126, at 44 (quoting a memo from EPA Administrator Carol
Browner).
129 SPDES is New York's counterpart to the federal National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permitting program. The NPDES program requires that point
source discharges of pollutants into navigable waters must be permitted. 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(1988).
130 For a summary of California's efforts to streamline its permitting scheme for hazardous
waste under the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. 1993), see ELI/OTA REPORT,
supra note 21, at 83-86.
131 New York State Dep't Envtl. Conservation,Environmental Benefit Permit Strategy:DOW
Reworks Process for Renewing SPDES Permits, WATER BuLL., Sept. 1992, at 1 [hereinafter
EnvironmentalBenefit Permit Strategy].
132 Id. The New York State legislature adopted a law this summer endorsing this New York
experiment. Act of Aug. 2, 1994, ch. 701, 1994 N.Y. Laws 1716 (McKinney 1994).
133 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) (1988); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 17-0817 (McKinney
1984).
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a facility like Kodak Park, whose permit contains requirements for
approximately 63 pollutants in a discharge of more than 28.3 million
gallons per day,'3 4 or a facility such as a restroom that discharges
2000 gallons per day of sewage. According to the DEC's article summarizing the EBPS, for each renewal application it "typically took
about a year to complete this process and renew a permit. " 13 5 Because of the DEC's resource constraints, 136 among other factors, the
DEC "accumulate[d] a backlog of permits that it was unable to complete in a given year. "13 As of 1992, this backlog was about 350
permits. 138 As the DEC put it:
This meant that some permits that sorely needed to be modified to protect the waters of the state were stuck at the bottom
of the chronological review pile. Other permits that needed
only renewals, not modifications, were being subjected to the
same rigorous technical review as those requiring major modi139
fications, which seemed to be an inefficient use of staff time.
The DEC found, in short, that its traditional, calendar-dictated
"queuing" approach resulted in a misallocation of its limited resources. 140 The DEC was spending far more resources processing
some renewal applications than they deserved from an environmental and public health standpoint. By the same token, the DEC was
not getting to some permits that needed to be modified in order to
protect public health and the environment because of this chronological approach to processing permits. A quote from one of the DEC's
water program officials makes the point well: "We had to find a better way to do business. Work kept piling up because we simply did
not have the staff to grind out extensive technical reviews every five
years for all SPDES permits. The way we did business in 1972 was
not working well for us now."141
Four features of the fifteen criteria the DEC has developed in its
EBPS to help prioritize wastewater discharge permit renewal applications warrant special mention. First, the DEC has established criteria designed to facilitate the DEC's addressing significant
134 ANGUS EATON,

SHEET FOR

NEW YORK

STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL.CONSERVATION,

SPDES

PERMIT FACT

EASTMAN KODAK Co. 1,2 (Feb. 1994) (on file with the Albany Law Review).

135 Environmental Benefit Permit Strategy, supra note 124, at 1.
136 According to the DEC's September 1992 Water Bulletin, "staffing levels relative to the

workload" have fallen in recent years. Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.

at 1-2.
at 2 (quoting Dan Halton, Director of the Division of Water, Bureau of Wastewater

Facilities Design).
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polluters in a comprehensive way. That is, these criteria appear to
reflect a DEC effort to fashion program-specific priorities that are
mutually reinforcing or complementary, rather than inconsistent.
The DEC accomplished this by giving considerable weight in the prioritization decision-making process to whether facilities
will be ad1 42
dressed under other DEC regulatory schemes as well.
Second, the DEC's work to identify criteria for prioritizing among
wastewater discharge permittees in terms of their environmental
and health impact may be valuable to other environmental regulatory agencies that are seeking to establish priorities in this area.
Some of the DEC's criteria are relatively obvious. For example, the
DEC is likely to give a permit application high priority if modification of the permit "is likely to cause a major improvement to Water
Quality; will eliminate a water quality standards violation; eliminate a water use impairment; or correct other important environmental problems."143 Other agencies, however, might benefit from
learning how the DEC incorporates combined sewer overflow, antidegradation, and pre-treatment
issues into its wastewater discharge
144
permit prioritization process.
Third, the prioritization scheme is structured to avoid-low priority
permits remaining at the back of the "priority queue" indefinitely.
In order to ensure that no permit is ignored, one criterion
for priority
14 5
is the length of time the permit is on the priority list.
Fourth, the prioritization scheme expressly recognizes the importance of public concern and interest in the issuance of wastewater
discharge permits. 146 One of the factors that the DEC considers in
setting priorities is the degree of public concern relating to various
permits. 1 47 Thus, the EBPS strategy significantly enhances the pub-

lic's opportunity to participate in the renewal process. Among the
information made available for public inspection, the Department
includes the applicant's "priority ranking score" in the notice it provides for SPDES permit applications. 14 The DEC makes available
142 DAN HALTON, NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENvTL. CONSERVATION, SUPPLEMENTAL
INFORMATION ON PERMIT PRIORITY RANING FACTORS, at attachment 6, at 1 (Undated)

[hereinafter EBPS Memorandum] (regarding the Environmental Benefit Permit Strategy
(EBPS)) (on file with the Albany Law Review).
143 Id. at Attachment 6, at 1.
1" See id. at Attachments 6-8.
145 See id. at Attachment 6, at 2 (indicating that five points are added to the priority
ranking score for each year that the application remains on the list).
146 See id.
147 Id.
148 Act of Aug. 2, 1994, ch. 701, 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 1716, sec. 4, § 17-085(1)(a)-(b)
(McKinney 1994).
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the backup documentation for the priority ranking it has assigned,
149
and it accepts comments on the merits of that priority ranking.
Finally, the 1994 legislation creates a formal process for public review and comment concerning the merits of the priority ranking
scheme itself.150 The legislation requires the Department to consider public comments and to make any appropriate changes to the
system.15 ' In sum, among other features, the EBPS helps to make
the DEC's permitting process more democratic by ensuring that interested citizens have an opportunity to help shape the DEC's priorities up front.
In its July 1994 report, Improving Our Environment, Improving
Our Economy: Regulatory Reform at the Departmentof Environmental Conservation,52the DEC touts the benefits of its EBPS strategy.
The Department indicates that the EBPS has "allowed the Department to make progress in reducing the backlog of expired SPDES
permits."153 It notes that the EBPS has enabled the Department to
"simplify and streamline administrative processes" and to "insure
that technical/professional processes are accomplished according to
environmental priority. " 15 4 In short, the DEC views the EBPS program, approximately two years after its initiation, as successful. As
the EPA's Permit Improvements Team Task Force embarks on its
effort to improve the EPA's permitting processes, it should evaluate
innovative efforts such as the New York EBPS strategy that already
are in place and being utilized. 155
C. Improved PrioritizationThrough More Precise Targeting of
and Flexibility in Regulatory Approaches
A third strategy for improving governments' prioritization of their
environmental protection efforts involves diagnosing and curing
cases of"demosclerosis," as Jonathan Rauch puts it in his April 1994
book.' 5 6 Rauch defines "demosclerosis" as "government's progressive
149

See EBPS Memorandum, supra note 142, at Attachment 1.

150 Act of Aug. 2, 1994, ch. 701, 1994 N.Y. Laws 1716, sec. 5, § 17-0817 (McKinney 1994).

151 Id.
152 N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENvTL. CONSERVATION, IMPROVING OuR ENVIRONMENT, IMPROVING
OuR ECONOMY: REGULATORY REFORM AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION
(July 1994) [hereinafter IMPROVING OUR ENVIRONMENT].
153 Id. at 9.
164 Id.
155 ELI's August 1993 report identifies at least two other state permit program initiatives
that also warrant careful scrutiny: a "streamlined permitting" effort in California and an
experiment in facility-wide permitting that New Jersey has initiated. ELIOTA REPORT, supra
note 21, at 83, 111.
156 See generally RAUCH, supra note 1.
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loss of the ability to adapt.., like hardening of the arteries, which
builds up stealthily over many years." 57 He suggests that because
of demosclerosis, "with rare exceptions, we are stuck with everything
the government ever tries, 8 in part because programs 1create
con59
stituencies, which then lobby to maintain the programs.
The federal government has recognized the importance of revisiting existing regulatory regimes to determine whether they are fulfilling their objectives and, if not, considering changes that should be
made to improve them. 160 The federal government's efforts in this
157 Id. at 123.

Id. at 135; see also Alan Ehrenhalt, Government Needs Its Arteries Unclogged, TIMES
(Albany), Feb. 20, 1994, at B1, B3.
159 RAUCH, supra note 1, at 131-37.
160 This issue has been especially hot in the context of the current debate concerning
unfunded mandates. See Markell, supra note 4, at 885 (discussing the long history of the
unfunded mandates issue). As ACIR notes in a recent report, "By 1981, mounting concern
over the 'mandate problem' had produced a surge of regulatory relief and reform efforts on the
part of all three branches of the federal government to address the problems posed by
regulation." U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PUB No. A-126,
FEDERAL REGULATION OF STATE AND LocAL GovERNmENTs: THE MIXED RECORD OF THE 1980's 1
(July 1993) [hereinafter ACIR FEDERAL REGULATION]. Congress's actions include its
enactment of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1988), the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1988), and the State and Local Government Cost
Estimate Act, 2 U.S.C. § 653 (1988). In terms of activity in the executive branch, President
Reagan established a "Task Force on Regulatory Relief" early in his first term. He also issued
three Executive orders designed to (1) institutionalize Presidential control over the regulatory
process (Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985)), (2) restrain the issuance of costly
mandates (Exec. Order No.12,291, 3 C.F.R. 187 (1981)), and (3) require that agencies consider
the federalism implications of their regulatory actions (Exec. Order No. 12612, 3 C.F.R. 252
(1987)). See also ACIR FEDERAL REGULATION, supra at 1 (discussing generally executive
branch activity in the area of regulatory reform).
Despite these executive branch efforts, however, "federal regulation of state and local
governments continued to increase during the 1980s." ACIR FEDERAL REGULATION, supra at
24. In fact, "[bletween 1981 and 1990, the Congress enacted 27 statutes that imposed new
regulatory burdens on state and localities or significantly expanded existing programs." Id.. at
iii. This record of regulatory expansion was comparable to, and in some respects surpassed,
the unprecedented pace of intergovernmental regulation compiled in the 1970s, when 22 such
statutes were enacted. Id. Further, the "[miore prescriptive regulations added programmatic
requirements and compliance costs." Id. at 24. The ACIR Report describes this situation as "a
continuing increase in intergovernmental regulation during the same time the federal
government mounted the most direct attack ever on federal mandates." Id. The report also
contrasts the 1970s and 1980s with earlier decades: "[T]he 1970s and 1980s stand out from
earlier decades in their reliance on regulating state and local governments, rather than
providing financial subsidies to these entities, to influence their actions." Id. at 55.
In sum, the federal government has made efforts to address the issue of regulatory reform in
general and environmental mandates in particular, with apparently little success. As one
commentator notes, while the issue of unfunded governmental mandates imposed on local
governments has been important since the 1960s, it now is the number one intergovernmental
issue in the United States due to the cumulative impact of state and federal mandates.
MEETING NOTES, supra note 43, at 3; see also Shelley Emling, Mandates Drying Up County
Funds Enough, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 24, 1993, at B1 (stating that "[giripes about
158
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area have an extensive history. 161 The current administration's
work in reinventing government adopts this theme as one of its primary areas of focus in its search for ways to "make government work
better and cost less."162 In determining how best, systematically, to
approach the task of reinventing government by reforming existing
regulatory schemes, the federal government should consider two significant institutional approaches that New York State has created to
address this issue.
New York State first embarked on the path of revisiting regulatory approaches with Governor Cuomo's issuance of Executive Order
108 in January 1988.163 This executive order established a regulatory reform program which involved reevaluate regulations to ensure that they adequately protected public health, safety, and
welfare, but also did not create undue regulatory burdens.' 6 ' The
state's first full-scale experiment in the field of environmental regulation concerned New York's process and requirements for closing
solid waste landfills. 6 ' This experiment appears to have won widespread acclaim.' 66 Participants in the process endorsed the experience as a prototype and recommended its use in other contexts. 16 7
According to the director of the state's Office for Regulatory and
Management Assistance (ORMA), who coordinated the effort, the
success stemmed, in part, from the lessons the state learned from its
previous forays into the regulatory reform process.' 68 She identified
unfunded mandates are not new, but they're growing louder as the demands grow more
costly").
161 See, e.g., EPBS Memorandum, supra note 142, at Attachment 6, at 2; see also Lazarus,
supra note 7; supra note 160 and accompanying text.
162 NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1, at i; see also Exec. Order No. 12,866,
3 C.F.R. 638 (1993) (replacing Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 187 (1981), President Reagan's
regulatory reform order).
163 Exec. Order No. 108, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.108 (1993).
164 Id.
165 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 360-2.15 (1993). In his 1992 State of the State
address, Governor Cuomo directed that his Office of Business Permits and Regulatory
Assistance (OBPRA), now known as the Office for Regulatory and Management Assistance
(ORMA), lead an effort to review the DEC's solid waste closure regulations. See OFFICE OF
BUSINESS PERMITS & REGULATORY ASSISTANCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT REGULATORY RELIEF
INITIATIVE: REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON NEW YORK STATE LANDFILL CLOSURE

REGULATIONS 1 (Nov. 1992).
166 Letter from Ruth Walters to Governor Mario Cuomo (Nov. 1994), reprintedin OFFICE OF
BUSINESS PERMITS & REGULATORY ASSISTANCE, supra note 165, at Appendix IV (Nov. 1992).
Governor Cuomo has issued two executive orders to address the issue of regulatory reform as
well, Executive Order No. 108, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.108 (1988), and the
superseding Executive Order No. 108.1, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.108 (1993).
167 OFFICE OF BUSINESS PERMITS & REGULATORY ASSISTANCE, supra note 165, at 3.

168 Interview with Ruth S. Walters, Director of the Office for Regulatory and Management
Assistance, in Albany, N.Y. (Sept. 16, 1994).
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the two requisite ingredients for success in such efforts as "targeting,
targeting, targeting"-i.e., keeping the review effort narrowly focused-and "inclusivity."169
The state's regulatory reform effort concerning the solid waste
landfill closure requirements had three significant components.
First, it did not rely solely on the affected regulatory agency to review its own regulations. Instead, it introduced into the process an
additional player which had an ability to influence the process in a
meaningful way, ORMA. 170 In fact, the Governor explicitly designated ORMA to lead the review of the DEC's landfill closure regulations. 17 1 The state's regulatory agency, the DEC, also played an
integral role in the discussions. As ORMA's director noted, the regulatory agency's participation was, as a practical matter, absolutely
essential for several reasons. In addition to the technical expertise it
brought to the discussions, the agency charged with implementing
the revised approach had to have a role in shaping the approach for
there to be the agency buy-in, which the director characterized as
1 72
indispensable for successful follow-up or implementation.
Second, ORMA made its review an inclusive one. It created a
work group comprised of multiple constituencies, including "State
agencies, local governments, environmental groups, academia and
17
local government associations" to conduct the regulatory review.
ORMA's director characterized the work group's efforts as involving
a "rigorous discussion and analysis among a diverse cross section of
representatives from... [the Governor's] office, State agencies, local
governments, environmental groups, academia and local govern" 1 74
ment associations.
Third, the New York experiment took an incremental, rather than
a radical, perspective in its deliberations. That is, in revisiting the
landfill closure regulations, the work group was not looking to revise
the underlying environmental objectives. Instead, it was seeking
the more incremental and modest result of changing the process and
its requirements to save money without relaxing environmental requirements. As the work group noted: "As a result of our deliberations, we have identified instances where landfill capping procedures
may be modified and the costs to local governments reduced without
Id.
170 See supra note 165.
169

171 See OFFICE OF BusiNEss PERMITS & REGULATORY ASSISTANCE, supra note

165, at 1.

172 Interview with Ruth S.Walters, supra note 168.
173

Letter from Ruth Walters to Governor Mario Cuomo (Nov. 1992), supra note 166, at 1.

174 Letter from Ruth S. Walters, supra note 166.

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 58

harming the environment or jeopardizing public health and
5
17

safety."

The work group concluded that by identifying these changes, it
had accomplished its mission-that the work group's "central objective has been achieved."176 It concluded that the "collaborative process used in analyzing these [landfill closure] issues ...[provides] a
model process for other State agencies together with local government and citizen groups to develop additional regulatory reforms."' 77 In endorsing this effort, the 21st Century New York
Project notes that through such successes the state "now [has] a
working group process that can be applied generically to any regulatory issue."' 78
Governor Cuomo recently created a more comprehensive approach
to regulatory reform, which bears close attention. In January 1994,
he directed in his State of the State Message that "[tlhis year we will
adopt a radical new change in our philosophy: a 'zero-based' regulatory system under which I will direct every appropriate agency to
examine its existing regulations top to bottom to see if they make
79
sense-individually and as a system."'1
On March 14, 1994, ORMA issued a Zero-Based Regulatory Reform Program Outline ("Program Outline") to implement the Gover175 OFFICE OF BusiNEss PERMrrS & REGuLATORY ASSISTANCE, supra 166, at ii. The effort
also took an incremental approach in that its focus, was narrow. The working group focused
only on a small part of the solid waste landfill regulatory scheme, and it concentrated its
efforts on landfills located in upstate New York. Interview with Ruth S. Walters, supra note
168.
176 OFFICE OF BuslmEss PERMITS & REGULATORY ASSISTANCE, supra note 165, at 2.
177 Id. at 3,5.
178 RuTH S. WALTERS, 21ST CENTURY NEW YORK PROJECT, THE NEW YORK PERFORMANCE
REVIEW 42 (1994). The members of the 21st Century New York Steering Committee are: Ruth
S. Walters, Chairperson (who also serves as head of ORMA, as noted above); Robert B. Adams,
Commissioner, Office of General Services; Patricia B. Adduci, Commissioner, Department of
Motor Vehicles; Joseph M. Bress, Director, Governor's Office of Employee Relations; Candice
T. Carter, Executive Deputy Commissioner, Department of Civil Service; John Ewashko,
Deputy Secretary to the Governor, Executive Chamber; John J. Feeney, Deputy Comptroller,
Office of the State Comptroller; Thomas A. Maul, Commissioner, Office of Mental Retardation
and Developmental Disabilities; Frederick Meservey, Executive Director, Council on Children
and Families; Rudy F. Runko, Director, Division of the Budget; and David Wright, Deputy
Secretary to the Governor, Executive Chamber. The purpose of the New York Performance
Review was to compare New York's accomplishments with the "reform agenda set forth by the
Federal government by Vice President Gore's National Performance Review." Letter from
Ruth S. Walters, Special Assistant to the Governor for Regulatory and Management
Assistance, to Governor Cuomo (Mar. 1994), reprinted in WALTERS, supra, at i.
179 OFFICE FOR REGULATORY ,&

MANAGEMENT

ASSISTANCE,

ZERO-BASED

REGULATORY

REFORM, PROGRAM OUTLINE i(1994) (reprinting Governor Cuomo's January 5, 1994 message to
the Legislature).
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nor's directive contained in his State of the State message. 1° ORMA
directed five agencies-the Departments of Health, Labor, Taxation
and Finance, and Environmental Conservation, and the Workers
Compensation Board-to "conduct an objective review of their existing regulations and regulatory practices, top to bottom."''
ORMA structured this objective review to contain the first two of
the three elements discussed above: it includes in the process an additional agency that has the opportunity to influence the regulatory
reform process in a meaningful way, l8 2 and it directs the agencies to
conduct outreach to their constituencies in conducting this effort.183
ORMA, however, appears to contemplate that these top-to-bottom
reviews may lead to more radical change than the incremental approach of not revisiting substantive standards followed in the landfill closure regulations effort. One of ORMA's charges to the
agencies is that they assess "excessive standards."8 4
ORMA's Program Outline suggests that the governor has included
some strong inducements to act on his directions. In particular, the
Program Outline (1) lists specific goals for the regulatory review; 8 5
(2) requires each agency to develop a plan to accomplish the review;
(3) establishes a deadline for the agency to complete the plan; (4)
gives ORMA an opportunity to review the plan; (5) authorizes
ORMA to assume oversight of the agency's regulatory review, or retain an outside consultant to do so, if the plan is inadequate or if the
agency is not making sufficient progress in its review; and (6) establishes time frames for reports on initiatives resulting from the
review. 186
In July 1994, the DEC issued its first report on its efforts to reform
its regulatory scheme. 8 7 The agency's initial report is significant in
several respects. First, it makes clear that the Department intends
180 Id. at 1.

Id.,
ORMA creates a role for itself in the Program Outline. Among other roles, ORMA will
review the agency's plan to conduct the regulatory review. Id. at 2. ORMA also indicates that
it may assume oversight of the review if the agency does not lessen regulation. Id. at 1.
183 See id. at 1 (directing the agencies to ensure "[i]nput from the business community and
affected interest groups, both early in the process when selecting areas for reform and during
the reform and implementation process").
184 Id.
185 The goals of regulatory review are to simplify and reduce paperwork, regulations, and
permits; assess duplicative or excessive standards; streamline regulatory practices; and
reduce time frames for permit issuance. Id.
181
182

186 Id. at 1-3.
187 ImpRoviNo Ou

ENvmo rmi Nr, supra note 152. This report appears to be the product of
the DEC's regulatory reform work that predated the governor's January 1994 State of the
State message and ORMA's March 14, 1994 Program Outline. Id. at 1. The Report notes that
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to listen to interested parties in deciding what regulatory reforms
are appropriate, noting that the initial report is "only the first in a
series of reports detailing DEC regulatory reform efforts," and that a
"major objective of the report is to seek the comments of the legislature, the regulated community, local officials, . . . environmental
groups and others on DEC's regulatory reform efforts."' 88
Second, the report identifies nine express action steps for improving environmental regulatory approaches, many of which themselves include several specific actions.'8 9 Thus, the DEC has made
public a list of specific regulatory improvements that it intends to
make. Presumably, this should increase the likelihood that such
changes will occur in a timely way.
Third, virtually all of the changes appear to be process improvement changes. For example, the DEC plans to eliminate unnecessary reviews in order to accelerate the permit process 90 and also
plans to expand programs "to help businesses comply with regulatory requirements."' 9 ' Further, the DEC intends to "work[ ] to eliminate duplication between state and federal permit programs," 19 2 and
plans to "eliminat[e] unnecessary reporting requirements."' 9 3
The DEC's focus on process improvements in its nine action steps
appears to be deliberate. In the introduction to its report, the DEC
indicates that its regulatory reform efforts are "guided by ...three
main themes,"194 all of which are process-oriented: (1) "[r]egulatory
redirection" (with the DEC providing two examples of such redirection: "eliminating unnecessary reporting requirements and lessening or eliminating reviews of activities that are unlikely to have a
negative impact on the environment"' 95); (2) cost effectiveness,
which the DEC defines as "[aissessing where and how specific environmental.., goals.., can be achieved more cost-effectively"; 9 and
(3) lower transaction costs, which the DEC defines as "[r]educing
transaction costs by making the environmental regulatory . .
the agency "accelerated" its regulatory reform efforts after receiving the governor's direction in
his 1994 State of the State message. Id.
188 Id. The report indicates that the DEC solicited public input in developing the report as
well. Id.at vi.
189 Id. at iii-vi.
iv.
190 Id. at iii,
191 Id.at iv.
192 Id. at v.

193 Id.at i.
194 Id. at 1.
195 Id.
196

Id.

1994]

States as Innovators

processes
. leaner' and speedier." 197 In summary, none of the
changes the DEC has identified in its nine action steps appears to
focus on changing substantive environmental requirements. 198
To sum up, New York State appears to have completed a successful experiment in the area of regulatory reform that seems to hold
considerable promise for use at the federal level. The narrowly focused experiment in the area of landfill closure produced a consensus among regulators, environmental groups, and regulated parties
on specific, concrete steps for refining the regulatory scheme to create additional flexibility without undermining protectiveness.
More recently, the state has embarked on a more radical and more
comprehensive experiment in the area of regulatory reform. It is
premature to speculate whether the Governor's zero-based regulatory initiative will succeed in producing meaningful reevaluations of
existing regulatory schemes and then actual changes to these
schemes in light of the reevaluations. 199 The very comprehensiveness of the ongoing effort, and the fact that it at least contemplates
possible relaxation of environmental standards, makes its ultimate
success, in this author's opinion, somewhat less likely than the solid
waste landfill closure experiment. Nevertheless, the DEC's initial effort to identify strategies for regulatory reform offers promise. It
suggests that agencies may be capable of identifying such strategies
when their charge to do so is comprehensive, as well as when their
marching orders are much more narrowly focused, as in the landfill
closure context. 20 0 This appears to be especially true with respect to
process improvements.
The fundamental point is that both experiments at the state level
warrant close attention from the federal government. 20 1 The opportunity to compare and evaluate these two very different approaches
Id.
Id. at iv-vi. One possible exception is action step number nine, which involves
"[dieveloping resource management plans as a way to establish environmental goals within
whole natural systems, ecosystems or areas." Id. at vi. Also, while not included among the
nine action steps, DEC identifies a pilot project that has the potential to revisit underlying
environmental standards themselves. This pilot project will evaluate whether the DEC should
shift from classifying all fresh groundwater in the state for use as drinking water to allowing
some groundwater to be below drinking water quality. Id. at 4.
199 The recent election, in which Governor Cuomo lost his office to George Pataki, raises
additional questions on the future of this effort. This author's impression is that this change of
administrations will heighten the priority that the DEC gives to "regulatory reform."
200 The DEC is currently holding a series of public meetings throughout the state
concerning its regulatory reforms. IMPROViNG OuR ENVIRONMENT, supra note 152, at 27. The
reaction of the DEC's various constituencies to these changes is not yet clear.
197
198

201 See McELIKSH & PENDERGRASS, supra note 15, at 4 (stating that "state programs provide

useful lessons for federal legislators"); Farber, supra note 23, at 801 (stating that
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adds to their value. The federal government should maintain a
watchful eye over New York's experiment with piecemeal and comprehensive institutional regulatory reform for lessons on how we can
best "reinvent ourselves" at the national level.2 °2
III.

ADDRESSING THE COST ALLOCATION ISSUE

Over the past two or three years, local governments have increasingly claimed that their share of the environmental infrastructure
costs, in both absolute and relative terms, is too high and that the
federal government has increased environmental mandates while reducing financial support.2 0" New York State has taken several steps
to share the funding load for such environmental infrastructure
costs. This section discusses one such step.20 4
Under New York's Superfund Law,2 °5 the state legislature tempers its making local governments liable for their ownership or operation of solid waste landfills by obligating the state to pay seventyfive percent of the municipality's share of liability for such sites.20 6
Among other reasons for this approach was the legislature's view
that local governments had historically provided a public service to
their communities by owning and operating solid waste landfills,
and the view that it was not fair to require local governments to
"[u]nsuccessful state programs are nearly as important, since observing them may save us
from making costly errors on a national scale").
202 In a recent article, the New York Times quoted Robert Hahn, an economist at the
American Enterprise Institute, for the proposition that the federal government has had
limited success itself in revisiting the federal environmental laws: "I can think of no instance
in which Congress has relaxed environmental regulations.... It's just not politically correct."
Peter Passell, DisputedNew Role for Polls: Puttinga Price Tag on Nature, N.Y. TiMES,Sept. 6,
1993, at Al, A36. But cf Keith Schneider, U.S. Set To Open NationalForestsfor Strip Mining,
N.Y. TMEs, Sept. 28, 1992, at Al, B6 (stating that " flor the past 15 months, President Bush
has pressed for changes in environmental regulations, and he succeeded in relaxing
restrictions on filling wetlands, cutting timber, exploring for oil, and mining copper, uranium
and other minerals on Federal land").
203 See generally Markell, supra note 4, at 885.
204 In addition to providing municipalities with funding support in the Superfund arena, see
infra notes 205-14, the state also provides financial support in other areas, including landfill
closure and wastewater treatment plant construction. See, e.g., David S.Liebschutz, The
EnvironmentalFacilitiesCorp., ENvrL. L. N.Y., June 1994, at 81, 81. The federal government
also contributes to the state's revolving fund to help local governments pay for the construction
of their wastewater treatment plants. Id. at 94.
205 N.Y. ENvTL. CoNsERv. LAw §§ 27-1301 to -1321 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994).
206 Id. § 27-1313(5)(g) (McKinney 1984). Other states, including Minnesota, also have
taken steps to share municipalities' exposure for some of these sites. See Minnesota Passes

Law Eliminating Liability for Closed Landfills, 8 Inside EPA's Superfund Report (Inside
Washington) 15-16 (June 1, 1994); Superfund Alternative Signed into Law, Allows Cleanup of
More than 100 Landfills, 8 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1460 (May 25, 1994).
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shoulder the entire governmental share of the financial burden associated with addressing these landfills.2 °7
The federal approach has been far different. Far from sharing the
cost with local governments, the federal government, before it will
contribute to the cost of cleaning up a municipally owned or operated
solid waste landfill, insists on an even greater cost share from local
or state government than it requires for nonmunicipal sites. 20

The

federal government's approach does not contribute to a good relationship between the various levels of government in connection
with the remediation of such municipal sites. 20 9 As suggested above,
such statutory impediments to good relations should be revisited.210
One commentator from private industry has suggested that a
state which sweetens the pot, such as New York, creates a strong
bias toward global settlements that include the private responsible
parties as well.2 1 ' As a result, that commentator strongly encouraged this action elsewhere to promote early settlements and expeditious cleanups.212 A municipal official echoed this view.2 1 3
The EPA should analyze the New York experience to test whether
these views have been borne out by experience. If they have, the
EPA should consider innovative ways to generalize from this approach at the federal level. Similarly, it should look to the plethora
of state Superfund and other environmental programs that create a
shared financial responsibility for environmental infrastructure
needs, identify innovative features, and then evaluate the experi-

207

See Governor's Memorandum approving 1985 N.Y. Laws ch. 35, reprintedin 1985 N.Y.

STATUTES 2641, 2642 (Consol. 1986).
208 Compare CERCLA § 104(c)(3XCXii), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(CXii) (1988) (requiring that
the state pay 50% of federally funded cleanups at state or municipally owned or operated sites)
with CERCLA § 104(cX3XC)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(cX3)(C)(i) (requiring that the state pay 10%
of all cleanup costs at all other sites).
209 See Markell, The Federal Superfund Program,supra note 10, at 59-63 (arguing that the
current cost-sharing structure leads to conflict rather than to cooperation).
210 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
211 Norman W. Bernstein, To Clean Up Landfills, the Leader Should Be Municipalities
Using Economic Incentives To Settle, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10012, 10012 (Jan.
1989).

212 Id.
213 See Peter H. Lehner, Act Locally: Municipal Enforcement of Environmental Law, 12
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 50, 50 (1993). Some support for such an approach is provided by cases
holding that local government operators of landfills that are on the Superfund list should bear
all of the costs that the local government would have incurred to close the landfill under solid
waste management requirements. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Amalgamated Servs., No. C92792D, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9761 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 1994).
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ence with these innovations to determine whether to adopt them at
the federal level.214
IV.

CREATING A MORE CREDIBLE COMPLIANCE SCHEME

Several, commentators have emphasized the important role that
compliance and enforcement activities play in ensuring an effective
environmental regulatory scheme. EPA Administrator Browner, for
example, has characterized enforcement as the "backbone of environmental protection."215
214 For additional information on the various state Superfund programs, see MCELFISH &
PENDERGRASS, supra note 15; OFFICE OF EMERGENCY & REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, PUB
No. 9375.6-08C, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 1993 UPDATE
(1993) [hereinafter 50-STATE STUDY, 1993 UPDATE]. This is the most recent of four editions of
the 50-state study. The three earlier versions are OFFICE OF EMERGENCY & REMEDIAL
RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, PuB No. 9375.6-08B, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE 15 & fig. 111-2 (1991) [hereinafter 50-STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE]
(discussing staffing levels in state Superfund programs); OFFICE OF EMERGENCY & REMEDIAL
RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, PuB No. EPA/540/8-91/002, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND
PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 1990 UPDATE (1990) [hereinafter 50-STATE STUDY, 1990 UPDATE];
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY & REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, PUB No. EPA/540/8-89/011, AN
ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY (1989) [hereinafter 50-STATE
STUDY, 1989].
Minnesota recently created an entirely separate program to address remediation or closure
of solid waste landfills. The state made the policy decision to fund the cost of closure of these
landfills. See Amendment Seen as ProtectingStates' Rights at Federal Sites, 8 Inside EPA's
Superfund Report (Inside Washington) 14, 15-16 (June 1, 1994); Superfund Alternative Signed
into Law, Allows Cleanup of More than 100 Landfills, supra note 206.
The author is aware that the EPA has invested considerable time in evaluating various
strategies for funding environmental infrastructure issues. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATION &
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, U.S. EPA, PUB No. 20M-2004, PAYING FOR PROGRESS: PERSPECTIVES
ON FINANCING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990).

215 'Reconsolidation'of Authority Would Lead to Stronger EPA Enforcement, Browner Says,
24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 547 (July 30, 1993); see NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF ENVrL.
CONSERVATION,

ANNUAL

REPORT TO

GOVERNOR MARIO

M.

CUOMO ON ENVIRONMENTAL

ENFORCEMENT (F.Y. 1989-1990) 3 (1990) [hereinafter FIRST ANNUAL REPORT]; NEW YORK STATE
DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVES: CIVIL PENALTY POLICY 1-2 (1990);
NEW YoRK STATE DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO GOVERNOR

MARIO M. CUOMO ON ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT (F.Y. 1991-1992) 1 (1992) [hereinafter
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT] ("The goals of the Department's enforcement program are to
maximize compliance with the environmental laws [] [and to] ensure that those who comply
with the environmental laws are not penalized economically compared to violators of these
laws who avoid the cost of good environmental citizenship.... A fundamental DEC objective
is to use enforcement as a tool to create a level playing field for complying companies."); U.S.
GAO, ALTERNATIVE ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE EPA 33, (1992); Agency To
Reconsolidate Enforcement Offices, Streamline Operations, 7 Inside EPA's Superfund Report
(Inside Washington) 27 (July 28, 1993) (stating that the creation of separate enforcement
offices throughout the EPA was an "effort to break the back of [the EPAs] enforcement
activities"); Michael C. Blumm, A Primeron EnvironmentalLaw and Some Directionsfor the
Future, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 395 n.129 (1992) (citing William K. Reilly, The Future of
Environmental Law, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 354 (1989) ("enforcement is 'at the very heart of
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Contemporary government compliance efforts face a special challenge due to the dramatic increase in the size of the regulated community in recent years.2 16 For example, in one statute alone, the
RCRA,2 1 7 the number of generators of hazardous waste subject to
RCRA subtitle C regulation grew from under 100,000 to more than
2 11,000.218 The government's compliance and enforcement resources have not kept pace with this growth.2 1 9 One point is clear:
the government lacks the resources to have its own staff oversee the
operations of the hundreds of thousands of facilities regulated under
the environmental laws, either continuously or even on a relatively
frequent basis (e.g., annually).2 2 °

Therefore, the question is what strategies should the government
adopt to maximize regulated parties' incentives to comply with their
obligations under the environmental laws given the impracticality of
actual government oversight of the regulated parties on a regular
basis. The answer is that countless innovative approaches exist. On

the volunteer, or carrot, end of the continuum are approaches such
as trying to create a "culture of compliance" among the regulated
community by offering rewards for particularly progressive companies. 22 1 Another example on this end of the continuum is providing
our regulatory programs' ")); F: Henry Habicht II, The Federal Perspectiveon Environmental
CriminalEnforcement: How To Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10478 (Dec. 1987); David L. Markell, Enforcement Challengesand Prioritiesfor the 1990s: A
State Perspective, 1 DuKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'y F. 30 (1991); David L. Markell, Enforcement
Trends at the DEC, N.Y. ST.B. Ass'N ENvTL. L. SEC. J., Aug. 1989, at 4.
216 See Fontaine, supra note 5, at 31, 32 ("the universe of sources subject to environmental
regulation has vastly expanded" in recent years); Hubert H. Humphrey, III & LeRoy C.
Paddock, The Federal and State Roles in Environmental Enforcement:A ProposalForA More
Effective and More Efficient Relationship, 14 HAav. ENVTL. L. REv. 7, 32 (1990) (noting the
dramatic expansion in the number of regulated parties); Markell, Enforcement Challengesand
Prioritiesfor the 1990s:A State Perspective, supra note 215; Leroy C. Paddock, Environmental
Enforcement at the Turn of the Century, 21 Envtl. L. 1509, 1509-15 (1991); Charles W. Burson
et al., State Environmental Enforcement Organizations,NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Aug.
1993, at 3, 3; David L. Markell & Dolores A. Tuohy, Some Thoughts on Running a Superfund
Program:A State Perspective, NATL ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. (Nov. 1990).
217 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. 1993).
218 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 27, at 226; Paddock, supra note 216, at 1510 ("In the early
1980's, a few thousand facilities were subject to regulation in Minnesota under the major
federal and state environmental laws. Today close to 100,000 facilities are covered by state
laws alone.").
219 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 27, at 119.
220 Id. At some point technology may progress sufficiently to better serve as the
government's eyes and ears. We are not yet at that point, although we are moving in that
direction. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7511a (Supp. 1994) (requiring certain major air pollution
sources to conduct "continuous emissions monitoring" or CEM).
221 Governor Cuomo recently announced the creation of an awards program
for companies
that excel in the area of pollution prevention. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL.
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initial technical assistance to help regulated parties learn what they
need to do to comply and how to do it. 22 2 Both the DEC and the EPA

have made initial attempts to use these positive reinforcement and
educational approaches to encourage compliance.223
At the penal, or stick, end of the continuum, both the federal and
state governments have, among other actions, significantly strengthened their criminal enforcement programs in recent years.224 Increased numbers of criminal investigators and other criminal
enforcement personnel and a growing number of criminal prosecutions for violations of the environmental laws send a strong message
that members of the regulated community may be exercising the better part of valor by complying with the environmental laws.225
Each of these initiatives has its place, and governments should
continue to use them in appropriate circumstances. This Article discusses below three other innovative approaches that New York State
has taken-and in some cases pioneered-to improve compliance
with the environmental laws that warrant careful review by the
EPA and by other states: (1) "operationalizing" the adage that an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure 'by investigating the
"fitness" of applicants for permits in certain industries and other
specific situations, and then granting permits only to those parties
that appear likely to comply with their legal responsibilities; 226 (2)
supplementing traditional government oversight of facility activities
NYS COMPANIES HONORED (1994). One feature of the
EPA's recently proposed "Environmental Leadership Program" is the agency's intent to
"publicly recognize .. . facilities that demonstrate outstanding environmental management
practices." Environmental Leadership Program: Request for Pilot Project Proposals, 59 Fed.
Reg. 32,062 (1994).
222 IMPROVING OUR ENVIRONMENT, supra note 152, at 11-13.
223 Id. at iii-iv.
224 Between 1989 and 1991, for example, the number of criminal convictions obtained by the
New York State Department Of Environmental Conservation jumped from 39 to 56. Compare
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 19 with FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 7.
CONSERVATION, NEWS RELEASE: Six

See also U.S. EPA, EPA 300-R-94-0032, ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT (F.Y. 1993)

1-1, 2-2 (Apr. 1994).
225 See, e.g., 1990 Pollution Prosecution Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Supp. 1990); NEW YORK
STATE DEP'T OF ENvTL. CONSERVATION, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO GOVERNOR MARIO M.
CUOMO ON ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT (F.Y. 1990-1991) 1 (1991) [hereinafter SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT]; U.S. EPA, EPA 300-R-94-003, ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT

(F.Y. 1993) 1-1, 2-2 (Apr. 1994); Markell, Enforcement Challengesand Prioritiesfor the 1990s:
A State Perspective, supra note 215, at 30. The federal government contractor listing and
debarment sanctions are other particularly onerous tools which address noncompliance. See
42 C.F.R. §§ 32.300 - .335 (1993); Edward E. Reich, ContractorListing:Powerful Sanction for
Encouraging Environmental Compliance, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Nov. 1991, at 5, 6.
226 See infra notes 229-83 and accompanying text. With the degree of self-reporting and the
shortage of government enforcement staff, it is very difficult for the government to supervise
closely every permittee, or even every significant permittee. Arguably, the best way to ensure
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by increasing the number of people serving as the government's

"eyes and ears" at a facility through a variety of creative approaches; 227 and (3) opening up the enforcement process to citizens'
groups and various segments of the regulated community during the
formulation of enforcement policies.2 2 8
A.

"Fitness"as a Guidepost for Permit Issuance, or "Keeping the

Bad Apples out of the Barrel."
Over the past twenty-five years, Congress and state legislatures
have established a set of environmental laws that is designed to
limit the risks associated with the use and disposal of pollutants by
compliance in some instances is to use the environmental laws to prevent a party from
entering a regulated industry.
227 See infra notes 283-325 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 328-34 and accompanying text. New York has initiated several other
creative approaches to improving compliance. First, the state has created a truly integrated
infrastructure in at least two respects. The state has consolidated or integrated its
environmental quality and natural resource protection functions, unlike the federal
government. As a result, fish and wildlife biologists, for example, work in the same institution
and, indeed, often in the same building and on the same floor as remediation engineers. Based
on this author's experience, a unified or integrated organizational structure greatly facilitates
interdisciplinary coordination and a comprehensive approach to issues. Further, the state has
built a regulatory agency that includes a large in-house peace officer unit. As of November
1990, the DEC had approximately 305 sworn peace officers, including 265 uniformed officers
and 40 undercover investigators. FiRST ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 2. Again, at least

intuitively such a structure seems to facilitate the interdisciplinary coordination that is
essential to effective compliance and enforcement work.
Second, the state (intentionally or not) has structured its environmental enforcement
authorities in a way that advances the "reinventing government" principles of "empowering
front lines personnel" and minimizing duplication to a far greater degree than has the federal
government. See NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 7 (stating that these

principles, among others, should be utilized in "reinventing" the federal government). State
law empowers the DEC to pursue violations of the environmental laws administratively or
judicially, without creating artificial barriers to its proceeding administratively. Several
federal environmental laws create such barriers to administrative enforcement. Markell,
supra note 23, at 1060, 1088-90.
Third, the DEC has "blanketed" the regulated community through a "cops on every corner"
approach in an effort to maximize its enforcement presence and demonstrate the agency's
consistency in identifying and pursuing violations. Markell, supra note 215, at 31-32. The
Department used this approach to substantial benefit in both a Clean Air Act enforcement
initiative and a petroleum bulk storage initiative. Id.; FoURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
116, at 14; THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 10-11.

Finally, the DEC has "blanketed" the regulated community in a different sense by
systematically pursuing "outliers,"-i.e., parties that are subject to the environmental laws
and have not been brought within the regulatory system. The DEC used this strategy
extremely effectively in pursuing facilities that had failed to file discharge monitoring reports
(DMR's) under the Clean Water Act. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 10; SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 225, at 8; Markell, supra note 215, at 32.
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limiting the rights of users and disposers of such pollutants. 229 The
centerpiece of the entire Clean Water Act, for example, is that parties interested in discharging pollutants into navigable waters must
first obtain a permit authorizing such discharge. 230 Absent such a
permit, parties are barred from discharging pollutants into our nation's waters. 2 3 ' Parties are potentially subject to criminal as well
as civil liability if they ignore this limitation on their freedom of action.232 In sum, no inherent right exists to pollute our environment.
Instead, polluting our environment is a privilege that the government has the authority to grant or deny.2 3 3

As a former head of the EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), James M. Strock observed in a 1991 article
that the EPA traditionally has focused narrowly on the potential
technical capability of the applicant to control pollution emissions in
deciding whether or not to issue a permit.2 34 Strock stated, "The
EPA bases its decision to issue a permit almost exclusively on the
technical capability of the applicant's plant, equipment, and personnel, and the applicant's ability to control pollution emissions at the
level mandated by the permit."2 5 Mr. Strock also stated that the
federal government's inquiries traditionally have not included an
analysis of the applicant's track record to determine whether the applicant is likely to meet its obligations, and concluded that "[tihe federal environmental protection program does not assess corporate or
individual integrity in the decision to issue a permit; thus,... bad
23 6
actors ... [can]not be denied permits on this ground."
See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Resource
Conservation & Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. 1993); Clean Air
229

Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. 1993). As noted previously,
see supra notes 45-75 and accompanying text, because of the piecemeal nature of the different
laws that make up this overall environmental statutory regime, it is by no means clear that

the whole equals the sum of its parts.

230 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Id. § 1362(7) (defining navigable waters as:
"waters of the United States, including the territorial seas").
231 Id. § 1311 (the few exceptions to this bar are not relevant here).
232 Id.

§ 1319.

233 See Berman Enters., Inc. v. Jorling, 793 F. Supp. 408, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that

the DEC could allow, as a public policy decision, respondents' sludge barges to operate only if
proof could be produced that their activity "is not threatening to the people or environment of
the state").
234 James M. Strock & Brian A. Runkel, Environmental Bad Actors and Federal
Disqualification,15 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 529, 538 (1991) (at the time of the article the OECA

was known as the Office of Enforcement).
235 Id. at 532.
236 Id.; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring denial of a permit
application for certain types of applicants if they are violating the law and not meeting an

agency-approved compliance schedule). Even this Clean Air Act provision is limited in at least
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This former EPA enforcement official seemed to attribute the
EPA's narrow focus to limitations in its legal authority. He indicated that the EPA "lacks a sufficient mandate to deny benefits to
bad actors,"2 3 7 noting that, with the exception of PCB disposal regulations (which Mr. Strock labelled as "ineffectual"),238 "no federal environmental statute or regulation requires a permit applicant to
inform the EPA of any past or current non-compliance with environmental laws."23 9 Obviously frustrated by this state of affairs, he
called on the federal government to take action240to "deny key governmental benefits to environmental bad actors."
three important ways. It only applies to permits for new or modified major stationary sources,
located within the same state, which are in a nonattainment area. Id. § 7503(3), (4).
237 Strock & Runkel, supra note 234, at 530.
238 Id. at 538 (stating that "serious deficiencies in the current PCB disposal permit
regulations reflect'a sad truth: the sole EPA permit program providing for background
disclosure and disqualification is ineffectual"). For PCB application requirements, see 40
C.F.R. § 761.65(dX3) (1993).
239 Strock & Runkel, supra note 234, at 533. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), administered by the
U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) rather than the EPA, provides the DOI with some
authority in this area. The SMCRA includes an Applicant Violator System (AVS) that, in the
words of one DOI attorney, is "a unique and ambitious computer system designed to block
owners and controllers of violators from obtaining new permits." Courtney W. Shea, Coal
Mining and the Environment:Does SMCRA Give Regulators Appropriate Enforcement Tools?,
NAT. REsoURCEs & ENV'T, Spring 1994, at 17, 17. As indicated previously, the Clean Air Act
requires that the EPA deny permit applications submitted by "bad actors" under certain
limited circumstances. See supra note 236.
240 Strock & Runkel, supra note 234, at 530. The EPA does have somewhat related
authority under the Federal Acquisition Regulation and under its contractor listing program
that warrants attention. EPA has authority to "debar" entities-to prohibit them from
contracting with the federal government. 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); 40 C.F.R. §§ 15.1 to 15.41 (1993); 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.400-.409 (1993). As one
commentator recently noted, this authority obviously has major implications for any company
"that does business with the government or benefits from non-procurement government
transactions, such as loans and loan guarantees." David M. Sims, Suspension and Debarment:
Potent Government Tools, SONREEL NEWS, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 1, 1. "Grounds [for debarment]
include fraud in connection with securing or performing a public or private agreement; ...
embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification ... of records ... ; poor performance or
violations of the terms of a public agreement or contract ... ; or a history of unsatisfactory
performance." Id. at 13. As this commentator notes, [a]n environmental offense may provide
cause where there is a reasonable connection between the misconduct and the business
integrity or performance of a potential contractor or participant." Id.
Mr. Strock expresses his view that the federal environmental permitting system has two
fatal flaws: "(1) the EPA's inability to investigate and gather background information on an
applicant's integrity and compliance record; and (2) the EPA's inability or refusal to act on
background information in its possession." Strock & Runkel, supra note 234, at 534. The
DEC's policy, discussed infra notes 253-283 and accompanying text, addresses both issues.
THoMAs C. JORLING, NEW YoRK STATE DEP'T OF ENvTL. CONsERvATIoN, RECORD OF
COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM 9-11 (Aug. 8, 1991, rev. Feb. 1993)

[hereinafter

ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM].
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Governments have historically evaluated the "bona fides" of prospective permittees or licensees in a wide variety of settings. "Fitness" is an issue in such diverse contexts as the issuance of drivers'
licenses, 241 auctioneers' licenses, barbers' licenses, and bowling alley
operation licenses.24 2
In a 1959 case, the New York State Court of Appeals upheld administrative agencies' authority to review the fitness of applicants in
determining whether or not to issue a license.243 In that case, the
court reviewed whether the Commissioner of Licenses had authority
to consider the character of an applicant for a cartman's license.244
The court's rationale was based on the "general proposition that the
power to grant a license necessarily implies power to withhold it for
good cause," 245 as well as the fact that the licensing provisions of the
City Charter and the Administrative Code implicitly gave such authority to the Commission.246
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the DEC's authority to
deny permits on the ground that the applicant was "unfit" in a 1985
case, Bio-Tech Mills, Inc. v. Williams.247 In that case, a paper mill
obtained a DEC permit in 1977 to discharge wastewater from its operations into the Battenkill Creek.248 The permit was issued for a
five-year term and was due to expire on March 1, 1982. In February
1982, the paper mill filed an application with the DEC to renew its
permit. The DEC denied the application, in part because of the paper mill's "flagrant and recurring breaches of the standards called
for in its present [1977] permit and its inability or unwillingness to
241 Kemp v. Hults, 216 N.E.2d 592 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 17 (1966) (upholding denial
of driver's license for past murder conviction and failure to fully disclose all criminal
convictions); see also Funaro v. Hults, 226 N.Y.S.2d 618 (App. Div. 1962) (upholding denial of
driver's license for fraudulent application and criminal record).
242 See Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell, 165 N.E.2d 163, 167-69 (N.Y. 1959) (citing
relevant case law).
243 Id. at 166.
244 Id. at 165.
245 Id. at 166.
246 Id. at 166-67.
247 484 N.Y.S.2d 292, 295 (App. Div.), aff'd, 482 N.E.2d 1223 (N.Y. 1985). The DEC has
denied or revoked permits on similar grounds in several other cases as well. See, e.g., Berman
Enters., Inc., No. R2-3291-90-11 (N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Mar. 25, 1992) (permit
denied); Frontier Chem. Waste Process, Inc., No. C9-5194-03-93 (N.Y. Dep't of Envtl.
Conservation, Apr. 6, 1994) (permit denied); America Transfer Co., No. 2-6006-00005/
000001-0 (N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Dec. 24, 1991) (permit denied).
248 The permit is known as a SPDES permit, the acronym for New York's permitting
program under the Clean Water Act, the State Pollution Discharge Elimination System.
Under certain circumstances, the Clean Water Act authorizes the federal EPA to delegate to
states the authority to implement the permit program required by the Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b) (1988).
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even substantially comply with the environmental laws." 24 9 The
DEC denied the application even though the mill had committed to
improve its treatment process because the mill's "persistent [permit]
violations outweighed any reassurances ... .that a new treatment
system would be operated within the confines of a renewed SPDES
permit."250 The mill challenged the DEC's denial, and both the Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
DEC's decision.2 5 '
Approximately three and one-half years ago, then DEC Commissioner Jorling issued his Record of Compliance Enforcement Guidance Memorandum.25 2 This Enforcement Memorandum launched
the DEC's effort to systematically evaluate and consider the "bona
fides" or "fitness" of permit applicants on a statewide basis. 25 3 In
February 1993, the DEC issued an updated version of this Enforcement Memorandum.2 5 4 The Department's policy objective in establishing this statewide strategy was to improve its regulatory scheme
by increasing the reliability and integrity of the permittees-those
individuals and companies that are permitted to operate under the
environmental laws-by ensuring that bad actors (that is, unsuitable persons) are not authorized to carry out responsibilities under
Department permits, certificates, licenses, or grants. 25 5
A review of the DEC's Record of Compliance Enforcement Guidance Memorandum reveals that the DEC grappled with four primary issues in formulating and refining its "record of compliance"
policy: (1) defining the types of conduct that are relevant; (2) determining how best to investigate applicants' backgrounds; (3) identifying which industries deserve priority attention; and (4) developing a
menu of sanctions for applicants whose records raise concerns.2 5 6
249 Bio-Tech Mills, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
250 Id. at 294.
251 Id.
252 ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 240.

253 Id. at 1-2. In this Enforcement Memo, the DEC cites two cases for the proposition that
"the environmental compliance history of a permit applicant is a relevant consideration
regarding qualification for permitting." Id. at 3 (citing Bio-Tech Mills, Inc. v. Williams, 484
N.Y.S.2d 292 (App. Div.), aff'd, 482 N.E.2d 1223 (N.Y. 1985); Olsen v. Town Bd., 557 N.Y.S.2d
633 (App. Div. 1990)).

254 Id. One commentator calls the current policy "the latest in a series of re-writes and
revisions in the last 2 1/2 years." Clarence D. Bassett, 'Bad Actor" Policy Revised, N.Y. Bus.
ENV'T, Mar. 24, 1993, at 3.
255 ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 240, at 2, 4-6; THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra

note 215, at 4.
256 ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 240, at 1-4.
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To assist the staff in implementing this policy, the DEC attempted
to provide concrete guidance concerning the types of past conduct
that are relevant in evaluating the applicant's fitness. To provide
some examples, the DEC's enforcement memorandum states that
[o]n a case by case basis, the following events, any of which
have occurred within ten years of the date of completion of the
record of compliance form, should be considered a basis for...
denying, suspending, modifying or revoking a permit in order
to protect the environment and preserve the natural resources
of the state as the circumstances may warrant. 5 7
1. An applicant's "convict[ion] of a crime related to the per258
mitted activity under any federal or state law."
2. A "determinl[ation] in an administrative, civil, or criminal
proceeding" that an applicant has violated the environmental laws, and "in the opinion of the Department, the violation that was the basis for the action posed a significant
potential threat to the environment or human health, or is
part of a pattern of non-compliance."25 9
3. A denial of a permit to the applicant for the same or a similar activity by the State of New York or by any other state
or federal authority.26 °
4. An applicant's having "engaged in conduct that constitutes
fraud or deceit" or having "made materially false or inaccurate statements in the permit application or supporting
pa26 '
activity."
permitted
the
of
conduct
the
in
pers or
5. An applicant's having been "convicted of the crime of filing
a false instrument or making a false statement to the Department or any other agency regarding compliance with
the laws of any state or the United States."262
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
260 Id. at 5.
261 Id.
262 Id. In Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell, the Court of Appeals offered its guidance
concerning the types of conduct that agencies permissibly may consider in reviewing the
fitness of applicants. 165 N.E.2d 163, 167-71 (N.Y. 1959). The court discussed the need to
focus on the nature and locale of the offense-in that case the fact that the conviction was for a
felony, specifically for the crime of extortion was important. Id. at 170. The court held that
[wihen one considers that the licensing ordinance regulates the rates chargeable by public
cartmen for the apparent purpose of preventing price gouging and related abuses, and
hence is specifically directed against a class of offenses comprehending extortion, the
relationship between the statutory design and the integrity and trustworthiness of the
proposed licensee is apparent.
257
258
259
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Furthermore, the Enforcement Memorandum provides that these
criteria for considering the suitability of an applicant are relevant
"not only to the immediate entity but to any other corporation, partnership, association or organization in which the permittee or applicant holds or has held a substantial interest or in which it has acted
263
as a high managerial agent or director."

The DEC's Enforcement Memorandum appears to contemplate
that the Department will obtain information in two primary ways:
(1) through the addition of a "record of compliance section" on appropriate permit application and renewal forms;26 and (2) through
background reviews of appropriate applications by various Department staff, including the Department's Divisions of Law Enforcement and Environmental Enforcement.265
The DEC's Enforcement Memorandum further appears to contemplate that, at least initially, the Department does not intend to apply
its "fitness" review across the board. Instead, the Department is
targeting specific industries. 2 66

Department managers, including

the DEC's Regional and program directors, "identify specific areas
within their jurisdictions that warrant use of the ROC form."267 The

Id. Further, the court noted that "the conviction was not for criminal activities remote from
the licensed business but was linked to the very industry in which petitioner seeks licenses to
pursue its calling-an industry which, as both courts below have emphasized, has been
infiltrated by criminal elements." Id.
263 ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 240, at 5; see also Barton Trucking Corp., 165
N.E.2d at 170 (supporting the position that the character of an applicant's controlling entities
is a relevant factor in determining that applicant's status). On the other hand, the
Enforcement Memorandum "[e]xempt[s] publicly traded companies from providing
background data on boards of directors." ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 240, at 11.
However, the Memorandum does require disclosure of "the names of all stockholders who own
10% or more of the stock in the applicant company." Id.
264 ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 240, at 4.
265 Id. As noted above, the DEC's Division of Law Enforcement included 265 uniformed

peace officers and 40 undercover officers as of 1990. Supra note 228. According to a recent
article, New Jersey's approach involves the state police and the Attorney General's office as
well as New Jersey's environmental regulatory agency, in contrast to the DEC's largely inhouse review. Strock & Runkel, supra note 234, at 544.
The communication of information within the agency is not automatic. Strock and Runkel
identify "turf" and other barriers to effective communications between governmental actors as
a major impediment to successful screening of applicants at the federal level. See Id. at 53335. In the DEC's case, the agency's ultimate goal is to create "a unified Department-wide
information system by which all program and enforcement data can be accessed."
ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 240, at 2. Its current division of responsibility for
compiling and transmitting information is intended to be an interim step. Id.
266 ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 240, at 10.
267

Id.
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final decision to use the form for specific companies or industries
rests with the DEC Commissioner.26 s
Finally, the DEC's policy seeks to retain flexibility concerning the
proper disposition of permittees or applicants whose records are
problematic, providing that they should be treated on a case-by-case
basis and noting that three options exist: (1) revoking existing permits or denying new permits;269 (2) conditioning the permits, perhaps through "strict reporting or monitoring conditions," to increase
the likelihood of compliance; 270 or (3) determining that the applicant
or permittee has rehabilitated itself, "such that ...

the entity can

carry out activities in a responsible manner."27 '
The DEC's efforts to create a consistent strategy for evaluating
"fitness" have not met with universal approval at the state level. A
recent New York State Senate report criticizes the DEC's practice of
conducting background checks of permit applicants on three
grounds.272 First, it claims a lack of legislative authorization for the
DEC's comprehensive approach.2 73 The report contends that the
DEC is authorized to conduct such "'fitness' checks ...

in only two

areas, medical waste transporters and hazardous waste transporters, "274 although the report concedes that courts have upheld the
DEC's authority to do so with respect to other programs as well.275
It recommends that the DEC cease conducting such checks until it
obtains legislative authority to do S0.276 Second, as an apparent
"fallback" criticism, the report criticizes the Department's creation of
this policy through internal guidance.277 It indicates that "[b]y establishing the fitness policy in this manner, the Department has bypassed the rulemaking process and input from the public and the
268 Id. The Enforcement Memorandum suggests, for example, that "fixed, longstanding
local permittees" may not be subject to the policy. Id. at 1.
269 Id. at 1.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 MAKING

ENVIRONMENTAL

REGULATIONS

WORK

FOR NEW

YORK'S

ECONOMY

AND

ENVIRONMENT: REPORT ON HEARINGS OF THE SENATE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION
COMMITTEE, LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON Toxic SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES,

LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 5, 24-25 (Mar. 1994) [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT].

273 Id. at 5, 24.
274 Id.

275 Id. at 24 (citing Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell, 165 N.E.2d 163 (N.Y. 1959)).
276 Id. at 5, 24. Further, the Senate report criticizes the DEC's approach on the basis that it
is inconsistent in terms of the amount of time it goes back. Id. at 24-25 (noting that DEC looks
back ten years while the statutory period for violations is only five years).
277

Id. at 24-25.
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regulated community."2 78 Finally,, the Senate report criticizes the
that it inappropriately treats parties in
DEC's approach on the basis
2 79
manner.
inconsistent
an
In sum, this author shares former EPA Assistant Administrator
for Enforcement James M. Strock's view that, it is time for the federal government to evaluate, and consider emulating, the efforts
that states such as New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and others have
taken to investigate the "bona fides" of prospective permittees before
granting authority to pollute. 280 New York's experiment reveals
that it would be worthwhile for the federal government to address a
series of threshold questions, including: (1) the appropriate process
for adopting such an approach, including whether legislative or regulatory authority is needed and also including strategies for obtaining public input in developing, an approach; (2) the parameters of
such a policy, including what types of facilities it should cover (i.e.,
whether certain types of industries are more likely than others to
violate the law, whether certain compliance schemes rely more heavily than others on the honesty of the permittee, etc.); (3) the scope of
the fitness check, including what time period it-should cover, who in
the corporate family and hierarchy it should cover, what types of violations it should consider, etc.; and (4) how to implement any policy
that the federal government adopts.2" 1 The DEC's experience has
pointed the way to consider these and other issues.28 2
278 Id. at 25.
279 Id. at 24-25.
280 Strock & Runkel, supra note 234, at 542 (commenting that New Jersey has
aestablishe[d] a system of background investigations to exclude individuals or companies from

participating in the waste industry if they cannot demonstrate 'sufficient reliability, expertise
and competency'") (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-133(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994)); see also
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3734.41-.47 (Anderson 1992 & Supp. 1993) (permit denied if
applicant does not meet criteria set out in Background Investigation Law); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, § 6018.503(c) (1993) (violation of any state or federal environmental law authorizes permit
denial); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-218 (1992) (requiring denial of hazardous waste permits if
a shareholder owning 10% or more of stock has been criminally convicted of unlawful storage,
treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste).
281 As IBM's Louis Gerstner, Jr. said soon after becoming Chairman of the Board, "[Wihile

strategy was important, it was action, not plans, that really counted. . . . 'The fundamental
Strategy is execution'." Steve Lohr, I.B.M. Chairman Lays Out
issue... is execution ....
Catch-Up Plan, N.Y. TImEs, Mar. 25, 1994, at D3.
282 The government will need to evaluate a series of constitutional issues in establishing the
parameters of any "fitness" review scheme. While such schemes clearly can be designed to
pass muster constitutionally, they do raise significant concerns, and obviously need to be
tailored carefully to satisfy privacy, associational, confidentiality, and vagueness concerns,
among others. See Trade Waste Management Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 233-39 (3d Cir.

1985); Strock & Runkel, supra note 234, at 559-62.
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B. Expanded Use of In-House and Out-House "Gatekeepers" To
Improve Compliance
As discussed above,28 3 the government relies to a significant extent on self-reporting to monitor compliance.284 In fact, it is increasingly moving in this direction.28 5 It is doing so with the recognition
that self-reporting creates data reliability concerns, as the GAO has
found.

2 88

In a 1991 report, the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) concluded that "gatekeeping" mechanisms involving third party oversight28 of facility operations are a potentially valuable compliance
7
tool.

It stated that "[glatekeeping mechanisms offer many poten-

tial benefits. The use of gatekeepers enhances achievement of regulatory objectives, promotes competent compliance through
professional performance of required actions, and minimizes government resources necessary to achieve regulatory objectives. Environmental programs are among the regulatory programs that could
take advantage of these benefits."28 8
In the same report, the ELI also noted that the use of gatekeepers
is relatively new and that both continued experimentation and the
sharing of information concerning these experiments is critical for
governments to learn how to best use this compliance tool:
The report concludes that since many of the most innovative and expansive environmental gatekeeping mechanisms
are still in the experimental phase, State environmental regulators must continue to experiment with these programs and
share with each other information on their successes and failures. Environmental gatekeeping shows a strong potential to
enhance environmental protection efforts.28 0
This section discusses New York's use of "gatekeepers" to promote
compliance. The author defines "gatekeepers" more broadly than
the ELI to include any actors that governments enlist to supplement
the traditional governmental regulatory compliance presence for the
283 See 8upra notes 220-29 and accompanying text.

284 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 122.41(1X4) (1994) (containing requirement that permittees submit
discharge monitoring reports (DMR)).
285 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (authorizing the administrator to establish self-

reporting requirements under the Clean Air Act).
286 See GAO CoMMENTs,

supra note 3, at 2-4.

287 ENvmoNMENTAL LAW INST., U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL GATEKEEPING IN STATE LAWS i
(Jan. 1991) [hereinafter ENVRONMENTAL GATEK.EEPING].

28 Id.
289 Id.

at ii.
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purpose of assuring "that regulated entities properly perform under
a regulatory scheme."2 9 °

1. "In-House" Gatekeepers
One approach that the DEC has used to heighten its presence at
facilities involves requiring facilities to fund the DEC's hiring of additional staff who will supplement existing government staff.2 9 1 The
DEC calls such people "environmental monitor[s]."2 9 2 The primary

function of such monitors is to "examine, on an ongoing basis, the
operation of [regulated] facilities."2 9 3

New York has three primary objectives in requiring facilities to
fund monitors to oversee facility operations much more frequently
than otherwise would be possible. First, the mere presence of
monitors (i.e., the DEC staff) is intended to encourage compliance
with the environmental laws.2 9 4 Second, through their presence the

DEC has "a much clearer picture of the facility's operations."296 This
"clearer picture" presumably facilitates the DEC's conducting any
follow-up at a facility should the need arise to take action. Finally,
monitors potentially serve as "ombudsmen" between the facility and
the local community.2 9 6

The DEC has developed a formal policy for determining when to
require regulated parties to fund environmental monitors for their
facilities.2 9 7 This formal policy articulates the DEC's belief that

monitors are useful:
Certain types of facilities, sites or regulated activities permitted by the Department have the potential to cause damage
to the public health and/or the environment if not properly
290 Id. at i. The ELI defines the term more narrowly to include only independent third
parties, not government employees. Id.
291 See, e.g., FouRTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 3-4, 15 (citing the imposition of
monitor requirements on two companies, Anitec and Bristol-Myers, and on the City of New
York's Housing Authority as terms of the consent orders).

292 Id. at 3.
REPORT, supra note 272, at 16; see also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§§ 27-0917(8), 27-0920(2) (McKinney Supp. 1994) (authorizing on-site monitors for
commercial hazardous waste management facilities that use land burial methods on the basis
that such monitors would ensure proper facility management and foster good relations among
the facility, the DEC, and the local community).
294 NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENvTL. CONSERVATION, ORGANIZATION AND DELEGATION
293 SENATE

MEMORANDUM No. 92-10: ON SITE ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORS 1 (Feb. 20, 1992) [hereinafter

0 & D MEMORANDUM # 92-10] (describing the policy behind requiring environmental monitors
on site).
295 THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 1.
296 See N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0920 (McKinney Supp. 1994).
297 See 0 & D MEMORANDUM #92-10, supra note 294.
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constructed, operated or implemented. To ensure proper construction, operation or implementation of these facilities, sites
and regulated activities and to guard against potential harm,
the DEC may require DEC on-site monitors on a full or parttime basis to conduct monitoring and inspections.., beyond
the routine or enhanced self-monitoring done by the facility,
298
site or regulated activity pursuant to DEC permits.
The DEC's policy lists, inter alia, the following four criteria for Department staff to consider in determining whether to require a monitor for a particular site:
1. There is a potential of uncontrolled release of pollutants
into the environment;
2. The material being handled at the site... is particularly
hazardous, due to its characteristics or quantity;
3. The site.., is particularly environmentally sensitive...;
4. The permittee ...

has a compliance record which reveals

an inability or unwillingness to comply with all environmental and healthlaws and regulations.299
In addition to providing its staff with specific criteria to use in determining whether to require monitors, the Department identifies particular types of facilities for which Department staff will seek
monitors; other types of facilities for which Department staff should
seek monitors; and further types of facilities for which Department
staff may seek monitors.3 °°
According to a recent New York State Senate Report, the DEC's
use of its monitor program has increased significantly in recent
298 See 0 & D MEMORANDUM #92-10, supra note 294, at 1. According to DEC's Fourth
Annual Enforcement Report, covering the 1992-1993 fiscal year, DEC's solid waste task force,
focusing on violations of the solid waste laws on Long Island, had negotiated 47 consent orders
by April 1993, with one form of sanction being a total payment of $431,000 to fund
environmental monitors. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 18. The Report
describes several of the 47 orders, including the amount each defendant was required to pay as
a penalty, and the amount of money it was required to contribute to the DEC's monitor fund.
Id. at 18-23.
California has developed a program requiring polluters to pay the cost of their regulation,
see ELI/OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 18-23, as has New Jersey, see Markell, Internalizing
the Costs of Pollution:Trends in US Environmental Policy, supra note 10, at 44.
299 0 & D MEMORANDUM # 92-10, supra note 294, at 2.
300 Id. at 3-4. Commercial facilities for the land burial of hazardous waste and commercial
hazardous waste process incinerators are two types of facilities that the DEC lists in the first
category. Land-based waste management facilities that dispose of significant quantities of
industrial waste and waste landspreading facilities fall into the second category. Under the
second category, facilities located in "sensitive environmental areas" may warrant monitors.
Id.
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years.3"' The Senate's report indicates that the DEC's use of on-site
environmental monitors has. nearly tripled since 1990, with the
agency currently employing approximately 100 such monitors, and
with an additional twelve monitors to be added during the 19941995 fiscal year. 2
As might be expected, reactions to the DEC's environmental monitor program are mixed. The DEC has found that monitors produce
the benefits anticipated, notably "increased compliance and better
community relations."30 3 Certain members of the business community have complained about a perceived lack of legal authority for
the program, as well as what they perceive to be its excessive
costs. 3 0 4 A recent court decision upholding the DEC's requirement of
an on-site monitor 30 5 may moderate criticisms relating to legal authority. Nonetheless, the recent New York Senate report indicates
that "[d]espite the court's ruling, it is apparent that questions still
exist regarding the Department's authority for, and implementation
of, increasingly broad use of on-site environmental monitors."30 6
In terms of the cost issue, the Senate report indicates that larger
facilities "have as many as five or six monitors on premises" and that
"[t]his costs each of these facilities as much as $500,000 annually."30 7 The report cites testimony that the DEC's current management of the program creates the potential for overuse and a lack of
accountability because it "contains no provision for caps on the
number of monitors imposed, no ceiling on the costs a facility must
sustain in order to fund on-site environmental monitors, and no provision for terminating the need for monitors at a site."30 8 As would
be expected based upon these criticisms, the Senate report recommends legislation to "ensure the parameters and costs of the monitor
program are properly prescribed."30 s It concludes that "[wlithout
such provisions, the potential for overuse or misuse of the program
exists."3 0
301 SENATE REPORT, supra note 272, at 4.
302 Id. at 4, 16.

303 Id. at 18.

304 Id. at 4, 16-18 (noting that industry representatives also contend that the cost of
monitors is burdensome and that there is a "lack of commensurate environmental benefits").
305 C.I.D. Landfill, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 561 N.Y.S.2d 936
(App. Div. 1990), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 398 (N.Y. 1991).
306 SENATE REPORT, supra note 272, at 17.

307 Id.at 18.
308 Id. at 17-18.
309 Id. at 17.
310 Id. at 18.
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Economists and others have long promoted the use of environmental laws to "internalize" the costs of pollution by mandating that regulated parties which require heightened oversight pay for the cost of
such oversight.3 1 1

This view has gained popularity in recent

years. 12 Environmental monitors are one manifestation of this philosophy. In this particular manifestation, the regulated party must
actually fund the regulatory agency's hiring of additional, dedicated
staff whose sole function will be to routinely oversee the facility's
operations.3 13
It is clear that the use of "environmental monitors" increases the
level of governmental oversight at affected facilities. While New
York has not yet compiled statistics or performed a detailed analysis
of the value which monitors add in terms of improved compliance or
enhanced community relations, the state's conclusion that the environmental monitor program has produced these positive results
seems intuitively plausible. 14 New York's experience reveals that,
in addition to the question of legal authority, the primary questions
likely to be raised by the regulated community in particular (if other
regulatory agencies seek to repeat this New York experiment) relate
to the appropriate scope and cost of the program, and to whether it is
administered fairly and consistently. Resource-constrained regulatory agencies tempted to follow New York's lead should seriously
consider wrestling with, and addressing, questions of this sort at the
outset. The DEC's environmental monitor policy provides a starting
point for such an evaluation. s i
2. "Out-House" Gatekeepers
A second strategy to compensate for governments' inability to
oversee facility operations closely is to use outside experts to conduct
such oversight.316 The DEC already has experimented with several
See Markell, Internalizing the Costs of Pollution, supra note 298, at 43.
312 See generally ELI/OTA REPORT, supra note 21, at 87-98 (offering examples of states,
such as New Jersey, whose programs incorporate this approach).
313 See, e.g., TirD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 1.
314 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 272, at i8.
315 See generally 0 & D MEMORANDUM # 92-10, supra note 294 (outlining the DEC policy on
environmental monitors).
316 See supra text accompanying notes 284-87. This is more what the ELI had in mind when
it discussed gatekeeping in its 1991 report, rather than agencies hiring additional staff to
perform this gatekeeping function. ENViRONMENTAL GATEKEEPING, supra note 287, at i
(defining a gatekeeper as "an independent third party... who is enlisted by the government to
assure that regulated entities properly perform under a regulatory scheme").
311
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different variations on this theme. 17 In an approach that is in some
ways similar to the environmental monitor concept discussed
above 31 8 but used when necessary to ensure compliance in particularly egregious cases, the DEC has ordered violators to hire DECapproved Certified Investigative Auditing Firms (CIAFs) to oversee
and audit every aspect of the violator's operations on an ongoing basis. 3 1 9 The DEC required the hiring of a CIAF by the Orleans Sanitary Landfill in Orleans, New York after an investigation uncovered
"systematic under-reporting of waste."32" Among other duties, the
CIAF reviews the ongoing operations of the facility and reviews the
company's paperwork submissions to ensure accurate reporting.3 2 '
As the Department's Second Annual Report on Enforcement noted in
summarizing the role of the CIAF, "[the Department] required the
hiring of a Certified Investigative Auditing Firm (CIAF) to serve a
CPA-type role in overseeing and auditing the company's operations
to ensure compliance with operating requirements."322
The DEC described the CIAF program positively in its Third Annual Enforcement Report:
DEC's enforcement program has pioneered the use of innovative settlement conditions that together with penalties help
to foster future compliance and minimize potential environmental degradation.... [One] approach[ I involves the use of
a Certified Investigative Auditing Firm ("CIAF"). CIAFs perform comprehensive audits of a company's environmental
compliance. They ensure that the company is reporting accu-

317 In addition to this use of outside professionals to oversee facility operations on an
ongoing basis, the DEC has required facilities to conduct facility-wide audits of their

operations, much like EPA has done. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 1 (describing

the use of certified investigative auditing firms); see also EPA, OPPE-FRL-3046-6,
Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, 25,007 (1986) (indicating
facility audits may be required as an enforcement tool).
ELI's Environmental Gatekeeping report identifies several gatekeeping initiatives that
other states have adopted, including the following: (1) Massachusetts's use of "certified toxic
use reduction planners" to review and certify toxic use reduction plans under the State's Toxic
Use Reduction Act; and (2) California's use of hydrogeological assessments prepared by a
.qualified person" required under its hazardous waste program. ENviRONMENTAL
GATEKEEPING, supra note 287, at 10, 25-6.
318 See supra notes 287-306 and accompanying text.
319 THmu ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 1.
320 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 225, at 2.
321 David L. Markell, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
Enforcement Prioritiesand Strategies, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N ENVTL. L. SEC. J., May, 1992, at 8,9.
322 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 225, at 2.
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rately to the regulatory agency and monitor compliance with
operating requirements.323
To date, the DEC has required a party to fund an independent third
party to oversee facility operations on an ongoing basis in targeted
situations, principally where the facility's compliance record reveals
that such heightened oversight is needed.3 2 4 The DEC appears to be
pleased with its experience with this limited use of independent
auditors.
The DEC's experiments with supplementary oversight personnel
also raise a more fundamental question stemming from governments' clear inability to closely oversee facility operations with traditionally available government resources. While beyond the
immediate scope of this Article, the governments need to investigate
the systematic integration of third-party auditors into the environmental regulatory scheme as a tool both to promote compliance in an
absolute sense and to add credibility to the compliance effort. The
Securities and Exchange Commission's integration of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) offers a possible model for such a regime.3 2 5
Further investigation of such possibilities has the potential to pay
positive dividends.
C.

Opening Up the Process

Another experiment or innovation in the area of environmental
enforcement that New York has initiated involves "opening up" the
enforcement or compliance strategic planning process. One of the
overriding objectives of enforcement is to ensure that the environmental laws are implemented consistently and fairly. 26 It is perhaps equally important that members of the regulated community,
as well as concerned citizens, perceive that the government enforces
the environmental laws fairly and consistently. Unfortunately,
323 THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 1 (emphasis omitted) (highlighting the CIAF
approach as an innovative enforcement mechanism).

324 Id. at 2 (giving an example of a situation in which a CLAF was required).
325 See

ENVIRONMENTAL

GATEKEEPING,

supra note 287,

at 5-9

(suggesting

that

environmental regulators look to the federal securities regime "for a time-tested model of the
gatekeeper mechanism"). The criteria that the DEC has established to help it determine when
in-house monitors are appropriate would be a valuable starting point for a more incremental
move in this direction. 0 & D MEMORANDUM #92-10, supra note 294, at 2-3; see also note 293
and accompanying text.
326 See NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENvrL. CONSERVATION, ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVES, CIVIL
PENALTY 1 (Jun. 20, 1990) (stating that "[tihe primary purpose of the policy is to articulate the

Department's policies for assessing and collecting penalties in a manner that will assist [the]
DEC in efficiently and fairly deterring and punishing violations").
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critics have evinced considerable skepticism concerning whether the
government's enforcement efforts have been fair and consistent.3 2 7
The final DEC innovation that I address in this Article focuses on
this credibility issue.
Approximately three years ago, then DEC Commissioner Jorling
took steps to improve the Department's credibility by opening up the
compliance and enforcement planning process to members of the
regulated community and citizen groups.3 28 In 1991, the DEC established an Enforcement Advisory Committee (EAC). 329 According to
the DEC, "[t]he purpose of the Committee is to provide a forum in
which the DEC enforcement staff and representatives of New York's
environmental groups and business community can discuss [the]
DEC's enforcement strategies and their impact upon the regulated
community."3 30 The Department believes this step of opening the
lines of communication has proven highly effective, noting "the Com331
mittee's activities have been applauded by all involved."
The federal government and other state environmental regulatory
agencies should consider creating such groups. Members of the regulated community and interested citizens are uniquely positioned to
offer invaluable insights concerning both how enforcement or compliance needs should be prioritized and how best to structure implementation of enforcement and compliance strategies so that they are
of maximum effect. To return full circle to a point made in the introduction of this Article and to again quote from the Amoco/EPA pollution prevention study:33 2 "developing effective solutions to complex
will take the best efforts of
environmental management problems
3 33
the many 'partners' in our society."
V.

CONCLUSION

The federal government is currently engaged in a mission to
reinvent government in which it seeks, among other things, to
327 SENATE REPORT, supra note 272, at 3 (suggesting that the'DEC employs "arbitrary
enforcement policies").
328 THIRD ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 5.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id. In addition to the creation of the EAC, the DEC has begun to publish for public

comment draft Enforcement Guidance Memoranda to improve the DEC's outreach to
regulated parties and other members of the public. It also has provided public notice of
significant consent orders and orders issued after hearing. Id.

332 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
333 Amoco STUDY, supra note. 3, at ii.
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identify new ways of doing business that will "make government
work better and cost less." 334 The nation's environmental regulatory
scheme has been the focus of some of this "good government"-related
work.3 3 5 While the environmental laws have accomplished a great
deal in terms of environmental protection, 3 6 a consensus seems to
exist that revisiting basic features of our environmental regulatory
scheme has the potential to be extremely worthwhile.337
The key point of this Article is that while many commentators remain preoccupied with environmental developments in Washington,
D.C., an enormous amount of creative activity is occurring in our
"laboratories of democracy." 338 As the federal government seeks to
learn how best to reinvent itself to address the concerns discussed
above and others, it will benefit enormously from carefully studying
the experiments in environmental regulation that New York and
other states have conducted and in which they are currently engaged. 3 39 This Article describes and analyzes several such experiments and identifies some of the other work that has been done to
identify innovative state activity in the environmental arena. The
federal government would be performing an important service for itself and others affected by our environmental laws by (1) making it a
priority to encourage such state experiments; 340 (2) developing a systematic approach to evaluating carefully the experiments that states
have undertaken; and (3) sharing the fruits of these experiments in

334 NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1, at i.
335 See generally GAO CoMMENTs, supra note 3; IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra
note 3; and REDUCING RisK, supra note 3.

336 See Reilly, supra note 3 at 352 (stating that the "experience of environmental
improvement ...is one of the great success stories of American life and history").
337 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
338 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
339 See sources cited supra note 28 (noting that states conduct 90% of the inspections and
about 70% of the enforcement cases). The role of the states as laboratories currently is a
matter of great interest in the welfare arena as well. As a recent article notes, one of the
interesting challenges for the federal and state governments is to encourage experimentation
in a way that will make it possible to determine what works and what does not. Too many
variables, to quote a Brookings economist on the welfare issue, leaves us with "a laboratory in
which all results are inconclusive." Eliza Newlin Carney, Test Drive, 50 NAT'L J., 2893, 2896
(1994).
340 This should also include an evaluation of instances in which the existing federal-state
relationship impedes creativity at the state level. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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terms of both what works and what does not work with federal and
other state decision makers.3 41

341 Further, there is little question, as several commentators have noted, that with
systematic encouragement for review and communication of state innovations, successful
initiatives "can ripple across the states." Thad L. Beyle, The Governor as Innovator in the
FederalSystem, PuBLus: J. FEDERALISM, Summer 1988, at 131, 134; see also Jack L. Walker,
The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 -AM. POL. Sc. REv. 880, 897
(1969) (noting that states may respond to programs adopted in other states given sufficient
interstate communications); Robert L. Savage, Diffusion Research Traditions and the Spread
of PolicyInnovations in a FederalSystem, PUrLIUS: J. FEDERALIsM, Fall 1985, at 1 (noting that
diffusion research could "significantly add to our knowledge of... [how] decisions are made in
the federal system").

